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Apportioning Liability
Behind a Veil of Uncertainty
J. SHAHAR

DILLBARY*

This Article challenges the reasoning that led most states to abandon the "no
contribution" rule. Under the rule, if a victim obtains a judgment against two
tortfeasors but chooses (even arbitrarilyor out of spite) to recover only from one, the
"chosen one" must pay the entire judgment while the other is exempted. This is the case
even if the paying tortfeasoris only i% at fault while the non-paying tortfeasor is 99%
at fault. The rule has been lamented by tort-reform crusaders as immoral and unfair.
One tortfeasor, the argument goes, should not bear the entire burden while the more
culpable tortfeasoris exempted from liability.In deviation from the priorliterature,this
Article employs economic theory to show that the "no contribution" rule that has been
crowned by some as efficient is fair and just. It adopts a contractarianapproach to
analyze different apportionment regimes includingjoint and several liability (with and
without contribution), several liability, and market-share liability. Relying on modern
decision theory the Article shows that individuals behind a veil of uncertainty, unaware
as to whether they would be victims or injurers, may in fact choose the much criticized
"no contribution" rule. In doing so the Article sheds new light on a fierce and ongoing
debate.

* Associate Professor, University of Alabama School of Law. B.A. in Law, Bar-Ilan University;
LL.B. in Economics, Bar-Ilan University; LL.M., University of Chicago School of Law; J.S.D.,
University of Chicago School of Law. I would like to thank Susan Randall, Alan Durham, Caryn
Roseman, Andy Morriss, Ariel Porat, Ian Ayers, Ronen Avraham, David Patton, Fred Vars, Heather
Elliot, Meredith Render, Grace Lee, and the participants of the Midwestern Law and Economics
Association Conference, the Italian Law and Economics Annual Conference, and The University of
Chicago Legal Scholarship Workshop for their comments; Tel Aviv University School of Law for its
accommodation while writing portions of this Article; and Tara Blake, Jonathan Kolodziej, and Joey
Steadman for their research assistance. @ J. Shahar Dillbary.
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INTRODUCTION
A major issue posed by the efficiency approach to the common law is
the discrepancy between efficiency maximization and notions of the
just distribution of wealth.
-Judge Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law.'
[L]aws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must
be reformed or abolished if they are unjust.
-John Rawls, A Theory of Justice.'
Suppose that pollutants and debris washed in from different lands
owned by different owners, commingled, and rendered the victim's
property unusable. If the victim recovered her damages from one of the
owners, can the latter seek contribution from the other owners? If so,
how much? These questions are in no way trivial. Under the common
law, if two or more people acted in concert or caused an indivisible harm,
each was jointly and severally liable to the victim. This meant that the
victim could seek recovery of the entire damage from any one or any
combination of the defendants. Because the common law did not allow
any contribution among tortfeasors, a defendant who paid the entire
judgment could not recover from the other defendants.' The result was
that if a victim obtained a judgment against two tortfeasors but chose,
arbitrarily or out of vengeance or spite, to recover only from one, the
latter paid the entire damages; while the other was exempt, even though
both were liable. This was the case even if the first was only I% at fault
while the other (the non-paying tortfeasor) was 99% at fault.
The rule of joint and several liability ("JSL") with no contribution
has been lamented by scholars and policy makers as unjust, immoral,
inefficient, and inequitable.' The subject of their concern is not the
victim. The victim is in fact indifferent between contribution and no
contribution. The concern is the seemingly unfair results between
tortfeasors. One tortfeasor, the argument goes, should not bear the
I. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 272 (7th ed. 2007) [hereinafter EcoNoMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW].

2. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (i97i) [hereinafter RAWLS 1971]; JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (rev. ed. 1999) [hereinafter RAWLS REVISED].
3. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1077 (2ooo); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON

ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 46, at 322-23, 346-47 (5th ed. 1984).

4. DOBBS, supra note 3, at 1078; KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, at 336-38.
5. See, e.g., Part I, Part II.B, infra notes 58-59,65, 71, 86-87, 109-21 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 588 P.2d 1308, 1314 (Wash. 1978)
("Contribution is directed at equitably distributing between or among multiple tort-feasors the
responsibility for paying damages suffered by the injured party. It is a remedial scheme which operates
exclusively between or among tort-feasors. It has no effect upon the injured party's initial right to
recover from the multiple tort-feasors." (citation omitted)); Mark M. Hager, What's (Not!) in a
Restatement? ALI Issue-Dodging on Liability Apportionment, 33 CONN. L. REv. 77, 95 (2ooo)
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entire burden while others who are often equally or even more culpable
are exempted from liability. It also allows the victim, the criticism
continues, to strategically cherry pick and recover from a tortfeasor
based on arbitrary whims, the depth of her pocket, or her ability (or lack
thereof) to defend herself.7 It is thus not a surprise that tort reform
champions have led a crusade to change the law, with much success.'
Today, Alabama is the only jurisdiction that has retained the rule of JSL
with no contribution.' Due to the fairness-between-tortfeasors concern,
the majority of states allows some form of contribution based on pro-rata
or fault, although many still deny contribution to intentional tortfeasors.'o
Some jurisdictions went even further and replaced the doctrine of JSL
with several liability, often referred to as "proportionate" liability." In
these states, each tortfeasor, if found liable, is responsible for her own
share only, and the issue of contribution does not arise at all.
Despite this success, the war that was declared almost four decades
ago is not over. Recently, Alabama's no contribution rule has been
questioned, 2 and in other states interest groups push for the complete
adoption of several liability. 3 Similarly, in the federal arena there is still
an ongoing debate as to whether Congress should overrule a thirty-yearold Supreme Court precedent 4 and abrogate the no contribution rule
between co-conspirators in antitrust cases.'" Fairness between defendants
(reporting that "[t]hough the ALI takes no official position against joint and several liability, it
registers disapproval repeatedly" and noting that according to the ALI JSL "may be unfair to
defendants").
7. For a summary of these arguments in the debate over the retention of the doctrine of joint
and several liability, see, for example, Richard W. Wright, Allocating Liability Among Multiple
Responsible Causes: A Principled Defense of Joint and Several Liability for Actual Harm and Risk
Exposure, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1141, 1147, 1150, 1160, 1183 (1987) (concluding that the efficiency

perspective is unhelpful because it "is a morally unattractive goal" and "because there is no efficient
allocation method" and arguing that JSL with contribution is the preferred way for allocating liability).
8. See, e.g., Lester Brickman, Ethical Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 833, 900
(2oo5) (reporting that JSL "has been the subject of intensive state tort reform efforts"); Michael K.
Steenson, Joint and Several Liability in Minnesota: The 2003 Model, 30 Wm. MITCHELL L. REV. 845, 845
& n.i (2004) (stating that JSL "modification is a key component of [the American Tort Reform
Association's] successful tort reform agenda" and noting that "[i]n Minnesota, as in other states, joint
and several liability has been a familiar target for tort reform efforts"); Joint and Several Liability
Reform, AMERICAN TORT REFORM Ass'N ("ATRA"), http://www.atra.org/issues/index.php?issue=7345
(last visited July 4, 201I) (arguing for the abolition of JSL and its replacement with proportionate
liability and noting recent changes in state law).
9. Susan Randall, Only in Alabama: A Modest Tort Agenda, 6o ALA. L. REV. 977, 980 (2009).

Io. DoBs, supra note 3, at 1078.
ii. Id. at io87.
12. Randall, supra note 9.

13. For a review of these efforts, see supra note 8; infra note 150.
14. Tex. Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639-4o (1981) (explaining that "[tihe very

idea of treble damages reveals an intent to punish past, and to deter future, unlawful conduct, not to
ameliorate the liability of wrongdoers" and holding that there is no right of contribution in antitrust
matters).
15. See, e.g., ANrrRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 251 (2oo7)
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has played a pivotal role in this debate. The antitrust debate gained new
momentum in 2007 when a bipartisan committee, created by Congress to
examine and revise antitrust laws," recommended that Con ress enact a
statute that would allow contribution in "all antitrust cases."'
This Article seeks to reopen and reinvigorate the discussion over
the desirability of the different apportionment rules by challenging the
very reasoning that led most states to change their laws: the fairness
argument. This Article argues that the no contribution rule is at least as
fair as, and perhaps even more equitable than, its alternatives: JSL with
contribution based on fault; several liability based on fault ("SL");
proportionate pro-rata liability ("pro-rata liability"); and proportionate
market-share liability ("market-share liability"). Unlike previous
accounts of the legitimacy of the apportionment rules, this Article uses
economics to show that the no contribution rule is moral and just. It
builds on the familiar "veil of uncertainty" concept first developed by
John Harsanyi 9 and then John Rawls.2 o The veil-by now a well-known
[hereinafter COMM'N REPORT] available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/
amcfinal-report.pdf (noting that "[t]he policy questions raised by these rules [JSL and no
contribution] have been debated extensively over the past two decades, particularly preceding and in
the immediate wake of the Supreme Court's 1981 decision in Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc.").
16. See, e.g., IIA PHILIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW I 330, at 43 (3d ed. 2oo7) ("[Mlost
arguments for a right of contribution in antitrust rest on the lack of fairness or justice in any rule that
forces one guilty party to pay for the offenses of another equally guilty party.").
17. Antitrust Modernization Commission Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, H§ I051-I io6o, 116
Stat. 1758, 1856-59 (authorizing the creation of the Antitrust Modernization Committee).
18. COMM'N. REPORT, supra note 15, at 244 (noting that "[tihe existing rules of joint and several
liability without a right of contribution and only limited claim reduction have given rise to substantial
criticism regarding fairness" and recommending that "Congress should enact a statute applicable to all
antitrust cases .. .allow[ing] claims for contribution").
19. John C. Harsanyi, Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of
John Rawls' Theory, 69 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 594 (1975) [hereinafter Harsanyi 1975] (criticizing John
Rawls' Theory of Justice); John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory
of Risk-Taking, 61 J. POL. ECoN. 434, 434-35 (953) [hereinafter Harsanyi 1953] (arguing that an
individual's moral value judgment indicates what social order she would choose in a state of "complete
ignorance" to what her position would be in the chosen social order had she had "an equal chance of
being 'put in the place of' any particular member of the society"); John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare,
Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. POL. ECON. 309, 315-16 (1955)

[hereinafter Harsanyi 1955] (drawing a distinction between an individual's moral value judgments or
"ethical preferences" which define the individual's social welfare function and express what an
"individual prefers (or, rather, would prefer) on the basis of impersonal social considerations alone"
and "'subjective' preferences" which define the individual's utility function and express what the
individual actually prefers); see also William Vickrey, Utility, Strategy, and Social Decision Rules, 74 0.
J. ECON. 507, 523-24 (s96o) (discussing a version of the veil which abstracts "from differences in age,
sex, or family status" and arguing that under certain conditions "the social welfare function takes the
form of a weighted summation of individual utilities"); Kenneth Arrow, Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian
Notes on Rawls' Theory of Justice, 70 J. PHIL. 245, 250 (1973) (noting that both Vickrey and Harsanyi
used a form of the original position "to supply a contractarian foundation to a form of utilitarianism").
Rawls in fact acknowledged Harsanyi's contribution in his seminal book, A Theory of Justice. RAWLS
1971, supra note 2, at 137 n.iI, 162 n.21; RAWLS REVISED, supra note 2, at 118 n.i,

140 n.22.
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concept-refers to a hypothetical situation in which people are divested
from their personal characteristics, save their ability to think and their
understandings of basic facts about the world." They do not know what
will be their gender or race once the veil is pierced. Nor do they know
whether they will be rich or poor, strong or weak, healthy or sick. In this
so-called "original position" they are all on equal footing. They are free
from personal interests, and therefore free from biases. Rules adopted in
the original position are thus considered to be fair and just.
The concept of the veil-a hypothetical situation-has special force
in deciding what apportionment regime should be adopted in tort law.
When individuals or their representatives promulgate liability rules, they
are truly behind a veil at least in the sense that they often do not and
cannot know whether in the future, after the law comes into effect, they
will be tortfeasors, victims, both, or neither. Similarly, at that early point
in time they do not and cannot know what fault levels will be assigned to
them by a jury if they are found liable." When the legislative process
takes place, these are usually unknown factors that will be revealed only
later in time. Of course, in real life some members of society do know
that they are likely to be defendants. Others know they are likely to end
up as victims. And each group of members would thus prefer different
apportionment policies commensurate with its narrow interests. But a
moral judgment must disregard such personal interests. More
specifically, following Harsanyi, the moral view adopted here is an
expression of a society one would prefer "if one had an equal chance of
being 'put in the place of' any particular member" of society.23 This
Article shows that if put behind a veil of uncertainty, rational selfinterested individuals unaware of whether they will be victims or
tortfeasors, both, or neither, and who give each member's interests the
same weight, would be either indifferent between the alternative
apportionment rules or would in fact contract for the no contribution
rule. The model developed here does not, unlike Rawls, assume that
parties are infinitely risk averse, nor does it adopt the much criticized
maximin rule.24 Instead, conforming with economic analysis and decision
theory, it recognizes that parties behind the veil may have varying risk
note 2, at 12 (coining the more familiar term: "veil of ignorance"); RAWLS
supra note 2, at II; see also Harsanyi 1975, supra note 19, at 595 ("In actual fact, this concept
[Rawls' veil of ignorance and thus the 'original position'] played an essential role in my own analysis of
moral value judgments, prior to its first use by Rawls in 1957."); infra Parts III.A.i, IV.B.
21. See supra note 19 and accompanying text; infra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
22. Unlike the original position, however, members of society are aware of their initial
endowments. A defendants organization, for example, will be interested in curbing liability and prefer
to adopt a SL or a contribution rule over JSL with no contribution. See infra Part III. Such a bias,
however, can be easily detected and should be ignored. See infra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
In any case, it cannot serve as a theoretical or "fair" basis for adoption of a contribution rule.
20. RAWLS 1971, supra

REVISED,

23. Harsanyi 1953, supra note 19, at 435; Harsanyi 1955, supra note 19, at 316.
24.

See infra Part III.A.2, Part IV.B.
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preferences, and it argues that such parties may nevertheless contract for
the no contribution rule.
Importantly, the framework suggested here employs economic
theory but it does not fall into the economist trap: it does not argue
simply that what is "efficient" must be fair. This indeed would be
unacceptable to many. After all, economic analysis does not seek to
eliminate all accidents, only those that are not cost justified." It views
accidents that already occurred as "sunk," and it is (mostly) neutral as to
whether a victim is compensated. It is perhaps then not a surprise that,
with a few exceptions, the economic literature has failed to take head-on
the fairness concerns that were so influential in the apportionment
debate. Some prominent economists even joined the trend denouncing
the no contribution rule as unfair." The model developed here is an
attempt to fill this gap. It shows that the no contribution rule, which has
been crowned by some as efficient,, 8 is also fair. It would likely be
acceptable, indeed contracted for, by members of society if put behind
the veil. In making this argument, this Article gives a contractarian
explanation for the adoption of the Hand formula in the tort of
negligence and it sheds some new light on its nonalgebraic "reasonable
person" formulation. In making the argument that the no contribution
rule is just, this Article also reinforces the conclusion that the rule is
efficient. It shows, for example, that the insurance feature embedded in
the contribution rules, and which was viewed as a possible reason to
adopt such regimes, is in fact a reason to reject them.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I traces the origins and
evolution of the no contribution rule. It shows that the abrogation of the
no contribution rule was consistent with the pursuit of fairness-though
not free of confusion-but was based on a misconception of what is fair.
It was consistent because it was motivated by a desire to achieve fairness
between tortfeasors. The no contribution rule was first applied only to
"joint tortfeasors" at the time when the term referred only to tortfeasors
who acted intentionally and in concert." Tortfeasors who concurrently
but unintentionally caused an indivisible harm were not considered joint
tortfeasors. Consequently, such tortfeasors had to be sued separately and
each was severally liable for the damage she caused even where the

25.

See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J.

LEGAL STuD. 29,

33

(1972);

infra

note 145.
26. See infra notes lo6-15 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 109-15, 163-69 and accompanying text.
28. See ECONoMic ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note I, at 189-9o; Frank H. Easterbrook, William M.

Landes, & Richard A. Posner, Contribution Among Antitrust Defendants: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, 23 J.L. & ECON. 331, 354 (1980); William Landes & Richard A. Posner, Joint and Multiple
Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 529 (198o) [hereinafter Landes & Posner
198o]; see also infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
29. KEETON ET AL., supranote 3, at 323-28; see also infra note 35 and accompanying text.
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damage was indivisible. The reason for insisting on proportionate
liability where liability could not be apportioned was to avoid injustice as
between the tortfeasors. One tortfeasor, courts consistently explained,
should not be liable for the damage caused by another. When the term
"joint tortfeasor" was broadened to include also those who caused
indivisible harm and SL was replaced by JSL, the law changed.
Contribution was then recognized for the same reason it was initially
denied: to achieve fairness between tortfeasors. It simply made no sense
and resulted in much injustice, it was argued, to place the entire liability
on one tortfeasor where two or more caused the damage.o
The fairness argument was based on a misconception because it
focused on the end result: that some tortfeasors paid more than their
share. Leading (distributive) theories of justice, however, do not focus on
fairness between the parties after the constituting event, such as an
accident, has occurred. At that time, the parties are already divided into
groups according to their interests, and the discourse of what is fair must
be biased. A tortfeasor would clearly prefer a regime that would
minimize her exposure, such as SL, and the victim would prefer a regime
that would increase her chances to fully recover, such as JSL. Thus,
modern theories of justice regard a rule as fair if it would be adopted
before the constituting event has occurred by parties who are unaware of
what the future will bring. If behind the veil parties would contract for a
certain rule, such a rule would be considered acceptable (by definition)
and just.
Part II reviews the fairness-efficiency debate as it has been framed
by the legal academy and self-interested organizations. It shows that with
the conclusion that all apportionment regimes can be equally efficient,
the debate has centered on fairness. These fairness considerations,
however, are overly simplistic. They focus mainly on the fairness
between tortfeasors and were motivated, indeed shaped, by lobbying and
defendants' organizations.' Building on Harsanyi, Part III constructs a
contractarian model that shows that rational, self-interested individuals
may in fact contract for a no contribution rule. Part IV turns to reevaluate some of the basic assumptions of the model in light of three
leading alternative theories of justice: Corrective Justice, Wealth
Maximization, and Rawls' Theory of Justice. It also reveals that at least
one state supreme court explicitly relied on Rawls' Theory of Justice to
justify the adoption of a contribution rule.3" The cursory decision adopted
Rawls' social contract approach-that "in exchange for the opportunity
of some undertaking, we each promise all others that we will be liable for

30. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, at 337.

31. See supra note 8; infra notes 127, 150 and accompanying text.
32. See Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Whitehead & Kales Co., 566 S.W.2d 466,474 (Mo. 1978) (en banc).
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the damage which our own negligence in the undertaking has caused." 33
But it failed to discuss Rawls' much criticized distribution (maximin)
rule, which this Article finds to be unsuitable for the contribution debate.
Finally, the conclusion discusses the implications of the model on the
current debate and provides closing remarks.
I.

APPORTIONING LIABILITY

A.

THE OLD COMMON LAW RULE: JOINT TORTFEASORS, JOINT AND
SEVERAL LIABILITY, AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
The term "joint tortfeasors" has meant different things at different
times and has been cluttered by procedural complications and much
confusion.' Originally, the term was very limited in nature. It applied
only to situations where multiple tortfeasors acted in concert, collusion,
or in pursuit of a common design to injure the plaintiff." Substantively,
the tort committed was considered a "joint enterprise" and consequently
each tortfeasor was held vicariously, or jointly and severally, responsible
for the act of the others." In the eyes of the law there was only one cause
of action and one injury." This meant that each of the joint tortfeasors
was liable for the entire damage and that all could be joined as
defendants.3 For this reason, the jury could not apportion the damages
between the different tortfeasors. 39 Even if one obtained access, while a
second imprisoned and a third inflicted harm, each was liable for the
entire damage. The parties' comparative fault, the fact that each
committed a different tort, or that the injury resulted from different acts
was of no consequence.4 o It was an "all for one, one for all" rule.
In these situations the plaintiff's discretion over apportionment and
execution of a judgment was-and still is, although to a lesser degreeinfinitely vast. The plaintiff could sue any one or any combination of the
alleged tortfeasors,4 ' and once a judgment was obtained, the plaintiff

33. Id. at 469 n.4.

34.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF

TORTs:

APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY

§ IO cmt. b (2ooo);

KEETON ET

AL., supra note 3, at 322.

35. KEETON ETAL., supra note 3, at 323; Wright, supra note 7, at 1148.
36. Swain v. Tenn. Copper Co., 78 S.W. 93, 94 (Tenn. 1903); KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, at 323.

37. Lucio v. Curran, 139 N.E.2d 133, 136 (N.Y. 1956). For this reason, if one of the tortfeasors
settled with the plaintiff the release of one tortfeasor was a release of all. See, e.g., Price v. Baker, 352
P.2d 90, 93 (Colo. 1959); McFarland v. News & Observer Publ'g. Co., 132 S.E.2d 752, 755 (N.C. 1963);
Simpson v. Plyler, 128 S.E.2d 843,845 (N.C. 1963).
38. See, e.g., Stull v. Porter, 184 P. 26o, 26o (Or. 1919); Daingerfield v. Thompson, 74 Va. 136, 151

(1880).
39. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, at 323 n.5.
40. Stull v. Porter, 196 P. III6, III8 (Or. 1921) (citing I COOLEY ON TORTS 213 (3d ed.)); Coleman
v. Bennett, 69 S.W. 734, 735 (Tenn. 1902); Riverside Cotton Mills v. Lanier, 45 S.E. 875, 875 (Va.
1903); 74 AM. JUR. 2d Torts § 69 (2oo).
41. Buddington v. Shearer, 39 Mass. 427,429 (1839); KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, at 325.
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could execute it fully against one or more defendants or partly against
one and partly against others.42 If the plaintiff filed separate suits against
the wrongdoers she could even refuse tender, continue to collect
judgments in the hope of obtaining a larger recovery, and then elect
against which of the wrongdoers she would execute the judgment.43 The
defendant, on the other hand, could not compel the plaintiff to add the
other joint tortfeasors to the action." The result was that one defendant
might pay the entire judgment. And because contribution was not
allowed, the defendant who paid the entire judgment could not recover
from the other tortfeasors.45
The term "joint tortfeasors" also had a procedural meaning.
Joinder-the technical act of allowing the plaintiff to sue a number of
defendants in the same action-was allowed when the defendants acted
in concert.46 Where the tortfeasors acted independently, however, joinder
was not allowed.47 In these situations liability was only several, and each
tortfeasor was liable for her own share even if the harm to the plaintiff
was indivisible.#" This is well illustrated by a line of cases in which animals
42. DOBBS, supra note 3, at 1078.

43. See Bradford v. Carson, 137 So. 426,428 (Ala. 1931); Fitzgerald v. Campbell, to9 S.E. 3o8,309
(Va. 1921); R. M. Harrison Mech. Corp. v. Decker Indus., Inc., 75 Va. Cir. 404, 414 (2oo8) ("[Pllaintiff
can only enforce one satisfaction for the same injury, and therefore must elect against which of the
several wrongdoers he will proceed to execution of the judgment for satisfaction of his damages.").
44. Hoosier Stone Co. v. McCain, 31 N.E. 956, 957 (Ind. 1892); Berkson v. Kan. City Cable Ry.
Co., 45 S.W. 1119, 1120-21 (Mo. 1898); Coleman, 69 S.W. at 735.
45. Doses, supra note 3, at 1078.
46. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, at 322-24.

47. In the early days of the common law the terms "joint liability" (the substantive rule that each
of the tortfeasors who acted in concert is liable for the entire harm) and "joinder" (the procedural rule
that allows the plaintiff to sue more than one defendant together), were subject to much confusion. See
id. at 329.
48. Id. at 325; I WILLIAM WAIT, A TREATISE UPON SOME OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW,
WHETHER OF A LEGAL, OR OF AN EQUITABLE NATURE, INCLUDING THEIR RELATIONS AND APPLICATION TO
ACTIONS AND DEFENSES IN GENERAL, WHETHER IN COURTS OF COMMON LAW, OR COURTS OF EQUrrY; AND

EQUALLY ADAPTED TO COURTS GOVERNED BY CODES 318 (1885). In Swain v. Tennessee Copper Co., the

court explained that
Where the tort feasors have no unity of interest, common design, or purpose or concert of
action, there is no intent that the combined acts of all shall culminate in the injury
resulting therefrom, and it is just that each should only be held liable so far as his acts
contribute to the injury.
78 S.W. 93, 94 (Tenn. 1903). The court continued, "In such cases the party injured must proceed in
separate actions against the several wrongdoers for the proportion of the damages caused by them,
respectively." Id. In the court's view "[tihis [was] the only reasonable and just rule that can be
applied." Id. It thus concluded that
If [the defendants] are joint tort feasors, each one is responsible for the damages resulting
from the acts of all the wrongdoers, and they may all be sued severally or jointly; but, if they
are not joint tort feasors, each is liable only for the injury contributed by him, and can only
be sued in a separate action therefor.
Id.; see also Blaisdell v. Stephens, 14 Nev. 17, 21-22 (1879) (holding that absent concerted action,
waste water from the lands of multiple land owners that damaged the plaintiffs property subjected
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owned by different owners entered the plaintiff's land and caused an
indivisible damage.49 In these cases it was consistently held that every
owner is severally responsible for the damages caused by her own animal
only."o Some courts allowed the jury to pro-rate the damage between the
defendants so that each would be responsible for an equal share of the
damage." Others left the difficult (impossible?) job of apportioning
damages between the defendants to the jury, often without any
guidance."
The facts in Russell v. Tomlinson" are illustrative. In Russell, two
dogs, each owned by a different defendant, entered the plaintiff's land
and killed her sheep. The trial court found the defendants jointly and
severally liable.54 On appeal the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
reversed." It held that each owner is responsible only for the damage
caused by his own dog. 5 The reason for insisting on a several liability
rule was couched in the requirement of fairness amongst defendants." In
Chief Justice Swift's words: "[I]t would be repugnant to the plainest
principles of justice, to say, that the dogs of different persons, by joining
in doing mischief, could make their owners jointly liable."8 Simply put,
in the court's view, one defendant should not be liable for a tort
committed by another. In reaching the same conclusion, the Van
Streenburgh v. Tobias court provided the following analogy:"
An ox and a calf belonging to different owners, reaching through a fence,
throw it down and enter the enclosure of another at the same time; it
would be unjust that the owner of the small animal should be holden to

pay the damage done by the larger; and yet he must do so if a joint action
could be sustained against both owners. The difficulty in accurately

each to several liability only).
49. See, e.g., Russell v. Tomlinson, 2 Conn. 206 (1817); Anderson v. Halverson, 1o N.W. 781
(Iowa 1904); Buddington v. Shearer, 39 Mass. 427 (1839); Miller v. Prough, 221 S.W. 159 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1920); Auchmuty v. Ham, i Denio 495 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845); Van Streenburgh v. Tobias, 17
Wend. 562 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837); Adams v. Hall, 2 Vt. 9 (1829).
50. See, e.g., Russell, 2 Conn. at 2o7-o8; Anderson, 1ol N.W. at 782; Buddington, 39 Mass. at 429;
Miller, 221 S.W. at 162; Auchmuty, i Denio at 499-501; Van Streenburgh, 17 Wend. at 562-63; Adams,
2 Vt. at I1-12.

51. Anderson, ioi N.W. at 782; Buddington, 39 Mass. at 429; Miller, 221 S.W. at 162; Little
Schuylkill Navigation v. Richards's Adm'r, 57 Pa. 142, 147 (1868) (citing Partenheimer v. Van Order,
20 Barb. 479 (N.Y. Supp. 1855)).
52. Russell, 2 Conn. at 207; Auchmuty, i Denio at 50o-o1; Van Streenburgh, 17 Wend. at 563;
Adams, 2 Vt. at 11-12; Sellick v. Hall, 47 Conn. 26o, 273-74 (1879).
53. 2 Conn. at 207.

54. Id.
55. Id. at 209.
56. Id. at 208-09.

57. Id. Prosser and Keeton, in their leading and much influential treatise, hypothesize that the
effort to apportion the damages in such circumstances was due to the no contribution rule. But this is
not just a speculation, as discussed above. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, at 349.
58. Russell, 2 Conn. at 207.

59. 17 Wend. 562,563 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837).
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estimating the separate injury done by each dog, is not an argument of
sufficient strength to warrant the injustice .... The jury must, in this, as
in most cases of wrong, get at the real damages in the best way they can.
Several liability with no joinder was also applied in cases where
sewage, debris, or fumes generated by different tortfeasors commingled
and damaged the plaintiff's property.6" For example, in Chipman v.
Palmer the defendant and other hotels discharged sewage that polluted
the plaintiff's stream.6 ' The court rejected the claim that an indivisible
injury subjects the tortfeasors to JSL.' Instead, it held, each is liable only
to the extent of the wrong committed by him, and that absent concerted
action, a joint suit cannot be brought.6 ' Rather, "the plaintiff must pursue
each of the wrong-doers separately." 64 The court explained that "[i]f the
law was otherwise, the one who did the least might be made liable for the
damages of others far exceeding the amount for which he really was
chargeable, without any means to enforce contribution or to adjust the
amount among the different parties."65
Over time a more liberal rule developed, allowing grocedural
joinder where an equitable remedy of injunction was sought. Many of
the decisions leading to the new exception involved situations in which
waters or fumes from lands owned by different owners commingled and
damaged the plaintiff's property. 67 For example, in Miller v. Highland
Ditch Co., the defendants caused water and debris to be diverted to the
plaintiff's property, thereby causing it damages.6 The trial court granted
an injunction and awarded damages against all the defendants jointly.69
On appeal the injunction against the defendants was upheld but the
judgment as to the award was reversed.o The court's rationale was, again,
rooted in justice between tortfeasors. If joinder were allowed, the court
6o. Chipman v. Palmer, 77 N.Y. 51, 53-54 (1879) (holding that SL with no joinder applies for
sewage discharged from a large number of hotels and polluted the plaintiffs stream); Little Schuylkill
Navigation Co. v. Richards's Adm'r, 57 Pa. 142, 147 (1868) (same for dirt from different coal mines
acting independently filled the basin of the plaintiff's dam).
61. 77 N.Y. at 52.
62. Id. at 53.
63. Id. at 53, 54, 56; see also Little Schuylkill, 57 Pa. at 147 ("Without concert of action no joint
suit could be brought.").
64. Chipman, 77 N.Y. at 56 (citation omitted).
65. Id. at 53-54.
66. KEETON ET AL., supranote 3, at 325-26; see, e.g., Miller v. Highland Ditch Co., 25 P. 550, 55152 (Cal. 1891); California. v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 4 P. 1152, 1157 (Cal. 1884).
67. See, e.g., Gold Run Ditch, 4 P. at 1158. Plaintiff, a mining company, together with other
unnamed plaintiffs, dumped debris into rivers, which decreased their depths and caused floods which
damaged adjacent properties. Id. Although the injury was clearly indivisible, the court held that where
several persons "acting independently of each other, engage in the commission of wrongful acts, the
torts are distinct and not joint, and each is only severally liable for the injury caused by his own acts,
and not for the torts of others with whom he was not acting in concert." Id. at 1157.
68. 25P. at 551.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 551-52.
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explained, "one defendant, however little he might have contributed to
the injury, would be liable for all the damage caused by the wrongful acts
of all the other defendants; and he would have no remedy against the
latter, because no contribution can be enforced between tort-feasors.""
The result was that in actions for damages each defendant had to be sued
separately and only for the damage it caused. The plaintiff could not join
the defendants as a matter of procedure nor could she recover her entire
injuries from one defendant."
But things did not stop there. Statutory reforms as well as
development in the common law led to the liberalization of the
procedural and substantive rules." These two trends resulted in much
confusion, which is outside the scope of this Article.74 Importantly,
however, at the end of the day the substantive rule of JSL and procedural
joinder were allowed in two situations important to this Article: (I) as
before, when the parties acted in concert; and (2) where the parties
concurrently but unintentionally caused the victim an indivisible harm.
B.

CONTRIBUTION

It is in this context that the no contribution rule should be
understood. The rule was originally adopted by the English courts in
Merryweather v. Nixan." At that time the term "joint tortfeasors"
referred only to those defendants who acted intentionally and in
concert." Because it was an "all for one, one for all" rule, a release of one
tortfeasor from liability by the victim served as a release for all. Similarly,
the satisfaction of the judgment by one tortfeasor was considered a
satisfaction by all. Courts were not willing to entertain any attempt by
one intentional tortfeasor to seek contribution from another, perhaps
based on the parties' "unclean hands.",' But once the proceduraljoinder
and substantive JSL rules were liberalized so the term "joint tortfeasors"
referred also to those who concurrently caused indivisible harm, the
attitude towards contribution had to take a sharp turn. Under a rule of
71. Id. at 551; see also Gold Run Ditch, 4 P. at I158 (permitting joinder in an action for an
injunction and explaining that "[i]n an equitable action for that purpose [injunction] there is generally
raised no question of damages").
72. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, at 325-26.
73. Id. at 325-28.
74. See supra note 47.
75. (1799)

iol Eng.

Rep. 1337 (K.B.).

76. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
77. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, at 330-31.
78. See, e.g., Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Whitehead & Kales Co., 566 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Mo. 1978) (en
banc) ("Early in Anglo-American law the 'rule' developed that there shall be no contribution or
indemnity between joint tortfeasors as 'a necessary consequence of the principle embodied in the
maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio [out of an immoral or illegal consideration an action does not
arise]."' (citation omitted)); see also Holcim (US), Inc. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 38 So. 3d 722, 727 (Ala.
2009).
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no joinder, fairness between negligent tortfeasors was achieved by
imposing an artificial rule of several liability in cases where the damage
was clearly indivisible." Thus, when the fumes of two factories
commingled and harmed the victim, or their streams flooded and
brought debris to her land, or their animals killed her sheep or destroyed
her crops, the damage was somehow arbitrarily divided. When joinder
was finally permitted and JSL applied in cases where the parties
negligently caused an indivisible harm, recognizing a right of
contribution was just a matter of time. Guided by the same logicfairness between tortfeasors -the courts allowed contribution to avoid a
situation in which one tortfeasor would pay more than her "fair" share.
This is well illustrated by Swain v. Tennessee Copper Co.8 and Davis
v. Broad Street Garage."' In Swain, an early case, the plaintiffs claimed
that two neighboring copper smelting plants emitted gases, which
"indistinguishably mingled, commingled, and intermingled into clouds of
noxious . .. vapor,

which . .. drifted

over

and

on

the

[plaintiffs']

premises" causing them damage."' The damage was clearly indivisible.8
Yet the court held that the defendants were not "joint tort feasors"
because they did not act in concert.84 It thus concluded that each factory
was severally liable for the damage it caused and must be sued
separately.8' The court reasoned that "it is just that each should only be
held liable so far as his acts contribute to the injury.... If the law were
otherwise, one whose acts contributed in a very slight degree to the
wrong could be held for great damages done by others. "86 It explained
that under such a rule "a citizen who allowed his private sewer to flow
into a stream in which the sewers of a large city were discharged, fouling
and poisoning its waters, however small the taint caused by his private
sewer, would be liable for the entire damage done."8' Swain, however,
was overruled half a century later by Davis. By that time, the law in the

79.
8o.
81.
82.
83.

See supra notes 48-72 and accompanying text.
78

S.W. 93, 94-95, 99 (Tenn. 1903).

232 S.W.2d 355, 357-58 (Tenn. 1950).
Swain, 78 S.W. at 93.
As was alluded to in Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. Rowe, 543 S.W.2d 337, 340-41 (Tenn. 1976)

(overruling Swain).

84. Swain, 78 S.W. at 99. The court explained that
If [the defendants] are joint tort feasors, each one is responsible for the damages resulting
from the acts of all the wrongdoers, and they may all be sued severally or jointly; but, if they
are not joint tort feasors, each is liable only for the injury contributed by him, and can only
be sued in a separate action therefor.
Id. at 94.
85. Id. at 99.
86. Id. at 94.
87. Id. at 95.
88. Davis v. Broad St. Garage, 232 S.W.2d 355, 357-58 (Tenn. 1950); see also Velsicol Chem.
Corp., 543 S.W.2d at 339 (discussing the development of the rule of JSL in Tennessee and citing Davis
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state of Tennessee had changed.' JSL liability was applied not only
between intentional tortfeasors but also between those who negligently
caused an indivisible harm.' Consistent with its rationale in Swainfairness between tortfeasors-the court justified a right of contribution.
Holding otherwise, it explained, would result in one tortfeasor
shouldering the entire burden for which two or more are liable."
II.
A.

THE EFFICIENCY-FAIRNESS DEBATE

EFFICIENCY

It is now well established that administrative costs aside," both the
contribution and no contribution rule-indeed any rule of
apportionment -can be efficient in achieving deterrence.93 The following
example is illustrative. Assume that T, and T., potential tortfeasors, must
both take precaution or the victim will suffer an injury of $ioo. If the cost
of precaution is $60 to T, and $20 to T., both will take precaution and the
injury will be avoided regardless of the apportionment regime. Under a
contribution rule, each party expects to share 50% of the damage
(assuming they are equally at fault). T will therefore take precaution
(20<50), and given that T. took precaution, T, will take precaution or she

will have to pay ioo% of the damage (60<ioo). The result would not
change even if T, was 99% at fault (and T. 1%). In the latter case, T, will
invest $60 in precaution to avoid an expected cost of $99 and knowing
this, T. will take precaution (20<ioo). A no contribution regime would

yield the same results. Assuming again that the expected liability of the
parties is $50 (because, for example, each has a 50% chance to pay the
victim), T, will take precaution (20<50) and, knowing this, T, will
similarly take precaution. So long as the total cost of the accident ($ioo)
is more than the total cost of care ($8o), one party has an incentive to
for the proposition that "[a] small minority of states -including Tennessee -eventually came to a
contrary conclusion, allowing contribution among joint tortfeasors without the aid of legislation").
89. See Velsicol Chem. Corp., 543 S.W.2d at 340-41.
90. Id.
91. Davis, 232 S.W.2d at 357-58.

92. Once the costs of litigation and the impact of the apportionment regime on the parties'
incentives to settle are introduced, the no contribution rule emerges as a more efficient one. See
Easterbrook, Landes, & Posner, supra note 28, at 354. But see Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L.
Revesz, Settlements Under Joint and Several Liability, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 427, 434 (1993) ("[A] regime
with no right of contribution has identical effects on the choice between settlement and litigation as
one with contribution."); infra note 95.
93. Easterbrook, Landes, & Posner, supra note 28, at 344; Landes & Posner 1980, supra note 28,
at 529 (noting that "any allocation rule (not just no contribution) under which the sum of the
tortfeasors' expected shares ... in joint-care cases are equal to i ... would provide incentives for
efficient accident avoidance"); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Contribution and Claim
Reduction Among Antitrust Defendants: An Economic Analysis, 33 STAN. L. REV. 447, 450 (1981) ("[I]t
is not possible to recommend any of the rules without making some judgments about... various
considerations."). For a critical review of the literature, see Wright, supra note 7, at 1169-79.
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take care, in which case the entire loss will fall on the second tortfeasor
unless the latter also takes care.94
The previous example deals with the case of "joint-care," where
both parties must take precaution or an injury will occur. But the no
contribution rule leads to efficient results also in cases of "alternative
care," where either party can take precaution. To illustrate, assume that
the $ioo accident may be avoided by T. at a cost of $6o or T. at a cost of
$20. In this case efficiency requires that only one party take precaution:
the cheaper cost avoider (T, in the example). Under a no contribution
rule with indemnity, even if the victim chooses to recover from T, then
the latter will be able to be fully reimbursed by T,. Indemnity simply
shifts the burden from one joint tortfeasor to another who is better
situated to avoid the accident, rather than dividing it between the
tortfeasors. Under a contribution rule the same result will occur (T, will

exercise care) if the parties are 50% at fault. But under some
circumstances, T, the high cost avoider, will take precaution if, for
example, she expects to be 81% at fault and indemnification is not
allowed.
Finally, once administrative costs such as litigation are considered
the no contribution rule appears to be superior. It conflates into one
proceeding what would otherwise require numerous court sessions to
determine the allocation of liability between tortfeasors in order to
recover the same amount. The no contribution rule saves the
administrative costs that do not increase - they may in fact decrease - the
parties' incentives to take care and results in a waste of valuable
resources to redistribute wealth.
Despite what may seem to be a pronounced superiority of the no
contribution rule, Landes and Posner identified two important
"economic benefits of contribution in joint-care" that left them, at least
initially, unable to declare a winner.96 The first is informational. The
argument is that if because of uncertainty the total expected liability is

94. Landes & Posner 1980, supra note 28, at 524-25. This is not, however, necessarily the case
when uncertainty is introduced. See id. at 525, 530.
95. Id. at 529-30. These benefits are discussed infra Parts III.C, III.F, IV.D. The incentives to
settle under the different regimes are subject to a fierce debate. See, e.g., Howard F. Chang & Hillary
Sigman, Incentives to Settle Under Joint and Several Liability: An Empirical Analysis of Superfund
Litigation, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 206-07 (2000); Easterbrook, Landes, & Posner, supra note 28, at
331-32; Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Multidefendant Settlements: The Impact of Joint
and Several Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 41, 42-43 (1994); Kornhauser & Revesz, supra note 92, at 42935; John H. Langmore & Robert A. Prentice, Contribution Under Section 12 of the Securities Act of
1933: The Existence and Merits of Such a Right, 40 EMORY L.J. 1015, 1019-20 (1991); Polinsky &

Shavell, supra note 93, at 455-56 & n.29; Timothy James Stanley, An Analysis of the Rules of
Contributionand No Contributionfor Joint and Several Liability in Conspiracy Cases, 35 SANTA CLARA
L. REv. I, 4-5 (1994).
96. Landes & Posner 1980,supra note 28, at 530-31.
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less than ioo%, an inefficient allocation of resources may result.97 The
second is the role of the contribution rule as a form of insurance.1 Here
the argument is that risk-averse tortfeasors would benefit from a
contribution rule." These two considerations led the authors to conclude
that "it is impossible at this stage of our knowledge to pronounce no
contribution a more efficient rule than contribution."'" Rather, the result
"depends on the trade-off between the administrative cost savings under
the former and the informational and insurance benefits under the
latter."'o' Despite these concerns, the authors concluded that "a broad2
contribution rule is almost certainly less efficient than no contribution."',
The conclusion that the no contribution rule is efficient, however, is
subject to criticism on at least two different grounds. First, the models
used by law and economics enthusiasts assume that actors seek to
maximize their utility and, in cases of uncertainty, their expected utility.
But because working with utility functions is a formidable task, to
simplify the analysis, the law and economics literature almost universally
assumes that the parties are risk neutral.'" The assumption allows the
economist to treat actors as if they try to maximize expected benefits (or
minimize expected costs) and yield definite predictions. The riskneutrality assumption has been criticized widely as being for the most
part an arbitrary assumption, one which frees the economists from reallife concerns and results in oversimplified models of little or no value.o4
Another possible criticism, and one that goes to Landes and Posner's
model, refers to the "two economic benefits of contribution" they
identified.'" Here, the claim is that these "benefits" may in fact justify
the adoption of a contribution rule which was rejected by the authors.
Part III attempts to fill a gap in the economic literature which, for
the most part, has failed to enter the fairness debate. It initially abstracts
97. See infra notes 173-79 and accompanying text.
98. Landes & Posner 1980, supra note 28, at 531.
99. But see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law,
15 GA. L. REV. 851, 867-68 (1981) [hereinafter Landes & Posner 1981] (arguing that tort law should
not perform an insurance function); see also Robert D. Cooter & Thomas S. Ulen, An Economic Case
for ComparativeNegligence, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. IO67, 1o98 (1986).
00. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE EcoNoMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 203-o4
(1987) (emphasis added) [hereinafter THE EcoNoMIc STRUCTURE OF TORTs]; Landes & Posner 1980,
supra note 28, at 531tot. Landes & Posner 1980, supra note 28, at 531.
102. Id. at 550; see also Peter A. Diamond, Single Activity Accidents, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. IO7, 140-45,
160 (974).
5o3. THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORTS, supra note oo, at 57; Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L.
Revesz, Joint and Several Liability, in TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS 126-27 (Michael Faure ed., 2009)
(analyzing the fairness of different apportionment regimes and concluding that JSL "performs badly");
Landes & Posner 1980, supra note 28, at 521; Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J.
LEGAL STUn. I, I (i980).
104. See, e.g., Mario J. Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641, 645, 655-58 (1980).

105. Landes & Posner 1980, supra note 28, at 530-31-
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away from efficiency to discern whether the no contribution rule is not
only efficient but also "fair," and it concludes that it is. In the process,
however, this Article also bolsters the efficiency argument for adopting
the no contribution rule. It argues that what Landes and Posner refer to
as the "economic benefits of contribution" are overstated at best. The
informational problem can be, and in fact was, mitigated by the common
law and the insurance feature of the contribution regime is not a benefit
at all. Rather, absent evidence to the contrary, it is a reason to reject the
contribution rule.
B.

FAIRNESS

Finally, even if the no contribution rule is truly efficient, the
question still remains whether it should be adopted in light of its
seemingly "unfair" results. The economic literature has failed to fully
address the fairness argument. In three separate publications Landes and
Posner,'0 and Landes, Posner, and Easterbrook'" noted in passing that
the no contribution rule is "fair" if analyzed from an ex-ante perspective.
The focus of these publications, however, was the efficiency of the no
contribution rule. The authors did not explain the basis for adopting the
ex-ante/ex-post approach; how such an approach would be impacted by
the uncertainty of litigation, insolvency, or transaction costs if at all; and
to what extent it could be extended to unintentional torts. Moreover,
their brief discussion was premised on the assumption that parties are
inherently risk neutral, an assumption the authors relaxed only in
discussing the efficiency of the rule.'
It is perhaps therefore no surprise that later attempts to address the
fairness issue from an economic perspective reached the opposite
conclusion. Cooter and Ulen, for example, take the position that "people
who cause an accident should compensate the victim in proportion to
their fault."'" They argue that requiring a tortfeasor to pay according to
io6. THE EcoNoMIc STaucruRE OF TORTS, supra note ioo, at 193; see also Landes & Posner 1980,

supra note 28, at 520.
Io7. Easterbrook, Landes, & Posner, supra note 28, at 332, 342-64. After acknowledging that
"[perhaps, also, 'fairness' rather than economic analysis should determine the outcome of the
contribution controversy" the authors analogized in two paragraphs contribution rules between
intentional joint tortfeasors in a price fixing cartel to a lottery ticket and concluded that "the case for a
contribution rule as a means of preventing unfairness is unpersuasive." Id.
1o8. Easterbrook, Landes, & Posner, supra note 28, at 332, 351, 353 (noting that consideration
such as different risk preferences "make[s] it impossible to conclude ... which rule is preferable," and
arguing that if "firms are risk averse, a rule of no contribution will have a greater deterrent effect");
Landes & Posner i98o, supra note 28, at 520-21, 531 (assuming risk neutrality and discussing the effect
of apportionment regimes on risk-averse individuals).
to9. Cooter & Ulen, supra note 99, at 1o95-96. Although the authors focus on comparative
negligence and conclude that it is "more efficient and more equitable" than its alternatives, the same
arguments hold for preferring a contribution rule over a rule of JSL with no contribution. Id. at lo7i;
see also Langmore & Prentice, supra note 95, at lo66 (noting that Cooter and Ulen's fairness argument
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her share of fault "seems to satisfy intuitive feelings about fairness"; that
just as tax law requires people with the same level of income to incur the
same tax liability, so tortfeasors "who are equally at fault should bear an
equal share of the accident's costs.""o In their view it is simply
"inequitable for one to bear a greater share of the accident's cost than
the other if their fault is the same."' To bolster their argument, the
authors take a contractarian approach absent in Landes and Posner's
analysis. Relying on Harsanyi and Rawls, they argue that behind a veil of
uncertainty, wealth-maximizing parties who "believe that they are
equally likely to be victims or injurers in future accidents," would prefer
an apportionment rule, which requires each tortfeasor to pay according
to her fault-a conclusion that this Article rejects."' The lack of
contractarian support for Landes and Posner's ex-ante equity rationale
and their reliance on a lottery example have led others to reject their
approach as "a very stinted view of the notion of fairness,'. one which
"has relatively little legitimating power" and is "illusory."" In a more
recent attempt, Kornhauser and Revesz reached a similar conclusion.
According to Kornhauser and Revesz, when it comes to fairness between
tortfeasors JSL "performs badly" because "it places a disproportionate
burden on the defendant with the smaller share of the liability.""
Outside of the law and economics literature, equitable and fairness
considerations, especially fairness among tortfeasors, have been the focus
of the apportionment debate. Opponents of the no contribution rule
argue that it is unfair that a tortfeasor whose share in causing the damage
was minimal will bear the entire burden of compensation, while others
who are more culpable will be exempted from liability."' They usually
would justify a contribution rule).
Ito. Cooter & Ulen, supra note 99, at 1095-96.

IsI. Id. at lo96.
112. Id. at 1097.
113. Langmore & Prentice, supra note 95, at ro66-67 ("[The lottery] analogy offered by
Easterbrook, Landes, and Posner reveals confusion on their part at a very basic level. Ex post equality
is unimportant in a lottery. The whole idea of a lottery is that there will be only one winner and
everyone else will have a less happy result.").
114. Scott C. Hecht, Tort Reform Revisited: An Alternative to Missouri's Comparative Fault
Settlement System, 62 UMKC L. REV. 247, 266, 268-69 (1994) (discussing Easterbrook, Landes &
Posner's lottery example, arguing that "the view that the ex ante perspective should define the extent
of extant fairness has relatively little legitimating power," and noting that "[a] strong consensus exists
supporting the idea that ex ante fairness is illusory").
115. Kornhauser & Revesz, supra note 103, at 126; see also infra notes 163-69.
I16. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 58 (Tenn. 1992) (declaring JSL "obsolete" and
explaining that it "fortuitously impose[s] a degree of liability that is out of all proportion to fault");
AM. BAR Ass'N, AcnON COMM'N TO IMPROVE THE TORT LIABILITY Sys., REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES 215 (1987) ("There is a perceived sense of unfairness in cases where the blameworthiness
of the defendant's conduct is so dramatically out of line with the ultimate burden of damages borne by
the defendant."); U.S. ATrORNEY GEN. TORT POLICY WORKING GRP., REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY
wORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN
INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY 33 (1986) [hereinafter TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP]
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spice the argument with "horror stories" such as Walt Disney World Co.
v. Wood where Disney was found to be only 1% at fault but was held
liable for the entire judgment."' Some complain that JSL with no
contribution allows the victim to target large, deep-pocket defendants,"'
while others take the opposite view, arguing that the rule allows the
victim to target small defendants."9 Both, however, conclude that the
rule is unfair due to the victim's ability to arbitrarily or strategically
choose from whom to recover.'2 o It is thus not a surprise that most states
(arguing the JSL "has been used to make a defendant with only a limited role in causing an injury bear
the full cost of compensating [the] plaintiff"); Wright, supra note 7, at 116o-62. Wright notes that as
between tortfeasors the no contribution rule leads to unfair results. This "sense of unfairness flows
from the fact that the tortfeasor with comparatively much greater fault escapes all liability, while the
tortfeasor with comparatively lesser fault bears all or almost all of the liability." Wright, supra note 7,
at II60-62.

117. 515 So. 2d 198, 198-99, 202 (Fla. 1987). Although in Disney the question before the court was
whether JSL should be replaced with SL and not a right of contribution, the concern that a party might
be required to pay more than her share of fault is at the heart of both issues. Id. at 200; see also Olson
Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 649 F.2d 1370, 1372 & n.3, 1377 (ioth Cir. 1979) (defendant whose
share was less than $3oo,ooo was denied contribution and had to pay $2.4 million); Note, Contribution
in PrivateAntitrust Actions, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1540, 1542 (1980) (discussing Olson Farms).
t8. TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, supra note Ii6, at 33-34 (recommending replacing JSL with
SL); Wright, supra note 7, at 1149, 1151-52 (criticizing the "deep pocket" argument); Steven F. Cherry
& Gordon Pearson, Why Twombly Does (and Should) Apply to All Private Antitrust Actions,
IncludingAlleged Hard-Core Cartels:A Reply to William J. Blechman, ANTITRUST SOURCE (Dec. 2007),
http://www.wilmerhale.com/services/practice/pubs.aspx?firmService=44 9 ("[In antitrust], [1]iability is
also joint and several with no right of contribution, which allows the plaintiff to pursue the
deepest pocket (or pockets) for full recovery of damages attributable to all participants in the
conspiracy.").
ii9. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Landes, & Posner, supra note 28, at 343 ("Several judges, and a
majority of the Senate Judiciary Committee, have asserted that under no contribution plaintiffs are
likely to sue relatively smaller firms and leave larger firms alone."); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 93,
at 455-56 & n.29, 466 (discussing both claims).
120. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.1 (2010) (referring to JSL as "the deep pocket rule" and one which
"has resulted in a system of inequity and injustice"); Alvarez v. New Haven Register, Inc., 735 A.2d
306, 312, 314 (Conn. 1999) (summarizing the law of JSL with no contribution under which "the

plaintiff could collect the entire amount of his judgment from the richest defendant, or from the
defendant with the deepest pocket" but noting that in enacting a tort reform "the legislature
effectively allowed for contribution among joint tortfeasors and removed the onus of the deep pocket
theory"); DeBenedetto v. CLD Consulting Eng'rs, Inc., 903 A.2d 969, 977 (N.H. 2oo6) ("[N]umerous
jurisdictions have enacted legislation seeking to ameliorate the 'inequities' suffered by low fault, 'deep
pocket' defendants as a result of joint and several liability."); Mitrione v. Monroe, No. I:02-CV-0 5 26
(LEK/RFT), 2010 WL 1539719, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2010) ("New York enacted Article 16 of its
Civil Practice Laws and Rules to '[limit[] the liability of persons jointly liable' in certain circumstances
and thereby 'remedy the inequities created by joint and several liability on low-fault, deep pocket
defendants."' (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. 160i (internal quotation marks omitted))); Jonathan Toby Dykes,
Alabama's Wrongful Death Act: A Time for Change, 21 Am. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 617, 647 (1998) (arguing
that JSL with no contribution is "not fair" because it "punishes ... a defendant [who] is slightly at fault
but has deep pockets"); Nancy C. Marcus, Phantom Parties and Other Practical Problems with the
Attempted Abolition of Joint and Several Liability, 6o ARK. L. REV. 437, 495 (2007) (arguing that JSL
with no contribution resulted in a "'deep pockets' problem" but arguing that "[w]hile the abolition of
joint and several liability may seem fair to a wealthy defendant, such abolition is actually detrimental
to the interests of many small business owners" who "under pure several liability ... are almost
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that have abrogated the no contribution rule did so either wholly or
partially to achieve fairness between tortfeasors.'"
guaranteed to be sued"). But see Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 n.3 (N.Y. 1989)
(applying proportionate market-share liability to diethylstilbestrolv ("DES") cases and explaining that
"joint and several liability expands the burden on small manufacturers beyond a rational or fair
limit"); Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act of 1979: Hearing on S. 1468 Before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust, Monopoly and Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 70 (1979)
(statement of Robert P. Taylor, antitrust practitioner) (supporting an amendment that would allow
contribution and noting that it "will provide immediate relief to a number of companies, usually
smaller ones, which are currently being subjected to extreme prejudice as a result of having been
swept into large class action proceedings along with other companies in their particular industry and
left to face disproportionately large exposure to liability after other defendants have settled"); id. at
67-68, 70 (statement of Donald G. Kempf, Jr., antitrust practitioner) (arguing that small firms are
likely to be named defendants and settle even if they are not liable in order to avoid a high risk of false
positive and concluding that the amendment will cure "a terrible injustice"); S. REP. No. 96-428, at I,
14-17 (1979) ("S. 1468, the Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act of 1979, is designed to rationalize the
process of the allocation of damages in an antitrust price-fixing suit, so that... smaller and middlesized businesses which find themselves in the midst of a price-fixing suit are not left responsible for the
liability caused by another's wrongdoing."); Paula A. Hutchinson, A Case Against Contribution in
Antitrust, 58 TEx. L. REV. 961, 982 (1980) ("Proponents of contribution attribute four major evils to
the no-contribution rule" the first of which is that "it allows a single defendant-perhaps
one small and less culpable-to pay for the sins of an entire industry."); Christopher R. Leslie,
Judgment-Sharing Agreements, 58 DUKE L.J. 747, 761-63 (2009). Leslie reports that some observers
argue that the unfairness on JSL with no contribution is "magnified by the fact that the plaintiff can
decide which alleged conspirator it would like in the vulnerable last position" and that it may decide to
sue "the smallest conspirator capable of paying the total damages" in order "to simplify and speed up
the litigation." Leslie, supra, at 761-63. Further, "the absence of contribution might be particularly
unfair to small players with lower market shares." Id.
121. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-61-202 (2011); Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7 (2on1); R.I. GEN. LAWS § Io-63 (1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-20 (1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 15-8-12, 15-8-15 (2011); VA. CODE
§ 8.oi-443 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.040 (2011); 1981 Wash. Sess. Laws 112; Greyhound
Lines, Inc. v. Cobb Cnty., 681 F.2d 1327, 1332-33 (1ith Cir. 1982) (applying Georgia law); Morris v.
UHL & Lopez Eng'rs, Inc., 442 F.2d 1247, 1254 (oth Cir. 1971) (applying New Mexico law); George's
Radio, Inc. v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F.2d 219, 220-21 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Patten v. Knutzen, 646 F.
Supp. 427, 428-29 (D. Colo. 1986); Petrolane, Inc. v. Robles, 154 P-3d 1014, loi9 (Alaska 2007);

Herstam v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 919 P.2d 1381, 1386 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996); Little v. Miles, 212
S.W.2d 935, 936 (Ark. 1948); Miller v. Stouffer, iI Cal. Rptr. 2d 454, 460 (Ct. App. 1992); Alfano v.
Randy's Wooster St. Pizza Shop II, Inc., 881 A.2d 379,385 (Conn. App. Ct. 2oo5); Farrall v. A. C. & S.
Co., Inc., No. 85 C-FE-io, 1990 Del. Super. LEXIS 67, at *3-4 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 2, 1990);
Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 SO. 2d 386, 390 & n., 391 (Fla. 1975) ("The majority of states have receded
from this doctrine either by legislation or judicial fiat in view of its inequity and harshness. The
rationale for this change of view is generally explained that principles of justice require that in the case
of a common obligation, the discharge of it by one of the obligors without proportionate payment
from the others, gives the latter an advantage to which he is not equitably entitled."); Mitchell v.
Branch, 363 P.2d 969, 977-78 (Haw. 1961); Masters v. Idaho, 668 P.2d 73, 76 (Idaho 1983); Skinner v.
Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 374 N.E.2d 437,454 (Ill. 1977), superseded by statute, ILL. REV.
STAT. 1985 ch. 70, pars. 301-05, as recognized in J.I. Case Co. v. McCartin-McAuliffe Plumbing &
Heating, Inc., 516 N.E.2d 260, 266-67 (Ill. 1987); Control Techniques, Inc. v. Johnson, 762 N.E.2d 104,
1o9 (Ind. 2002); Best v. Yerkes, 77 N.W.2d 23, 29 (Iowa 1956); Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867, 872-74

(Kan.

1978); Elpers

v. Kimble, 366 S.W.2d 157, 161 (Ky. 1963); Quatray v. Wicker, 151 So. 2o8, 210-12

(La. 1933); Hobbs v. Hurley, 104 A. 815, 816-17 (Me. 1918); Montgomery Cnty. v. Valk Mfg. Co., 562
A.2d 1246, 1248 & n.4, 1249 (Md. 1989); McGrath v. Stanley, 493 N.E.2d 832, 8 35 (Mass. 1986);

O'Dowd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 358 N.W.2d 553, 557-59 (Mich. 1984); Duluth, M. & N. Ry. Co. v.
McCarthy, 236 N.W. 766, 767-68 (Minn. 1931); Mo. Pac. R.R. v. Whitehead & Kales Co., 566 S.W.2d
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There are a number of compelling reasons why no contribution is a
fairer regime, many of which have been raised in support of retaining
JSL over its replacement with SL. These include the fact that: (I) each of
the joint tortfeasors caused and therefore is responsible for the entire
harm;' (2) each of the tortfeasors could have avoided that harm had
they taken more precaution; (3) contribution provides a culpable party
with a windfall because it reduces the liability of a fully responsible
tortfeasor simply because others joined her;' (4) a regime of SL or one
that allows contribution shifts the risk of litigation and insolvency to the
innocent victim; 4 (5) comparing fault between fully responsible
466, 473-74 (Mo. 1978) (en banc); Hampton v. Safeway Sanitation Servs., 725 S.W.2d 605, 607-08 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1987); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bush Hog, 219 P-3 d 1249, 1252 (Mont. 2009); Royal
Indem. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. CO., 229 N.W.2d 183, 189-90 (Neb. 1975); Evans v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 5 P-3 d 1043, 1050-51 & n.II-n.13 (Nev. 2000); Rodgers v. Colby's 01' Place, Inc., 802
A.2d 1I59, 1161-62 (N.H. 2002); Tino v. Stout, 229 A.2d 793,798 n-3 (N.J. 1967); Otero v. Jordan Rest.
Enters., 922 P.2d 569, 572 (N.M. 1996); Sommer v. Fed. Signal Corp., 593 N.E.2d 1365, 1372 (N.Y.
1992); Med. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mauldin, 529 S.E.2d 697, 701 (N.C. Ct. App. 2ooo), abrogated by Sterling
v. Gil Soucy Trucking, Ltd., 552 S.E.2d 674, 679 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001); Bartels v. City of Williston, 276
N.W.2d II3, 117 (N.D. 1979); Fidelholtz v. Peller, 69o N.E.2d 502, 5o6-o7 (Ohio 1998); Barringer v.
Baptist Healthcare of Okla., 22 P.3d 695, 698 (Okla. 2001); Blackledge v. Harrington, 634 P.2d 243,
244-45 & n.3 (Or. 1981); Jensen v. Alley, 877 P.2d lo8, iio & n.3 (Or. Ct. App. 1994); Swartz v.
Sunderland, 169 A.2d 289, 290-91 (Pa. 1961); Degen v. Bayman, 200 N.W.2d 134, 136-37 (S.D. 1972);
First Premier Bank v. Kolcraft Ent., 686 N.W.2d 430, 442 (S.D. 2004); Davis v. Broad St. Garage, 232
S.W.2d 355, 357-58 (Tenn. 1950); Lottman v. Cuilla, 288 S.W. 123, 126 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926);
Unigard Ins. Co. v. City of LaVerkin, 689 P.2d 1344, 1346 (Utah 1984); Howard v. Spafford, 321 A.2d
74, 76 (Vt. 1974); Haynes v. City of Nitro, 240 S.E.2d 544, 547 (W. Va. 1977); Brown v. Haertel, 246
N.W. 691, 692-93 (Wis. 1933); Halliburton Co. v. McAdams, Roux and Assocs., 773 P.2d 153, 155
(Wyo. 1989); Cheri D. Green & Michael K. Graves, Allocation of Fault:Joint Tortfeasors in Court and
the Ones Who Should Be, 63 Miss. L.J. 647, 649-53 (994); James T. Irvin III, Easing A Client's Pain
After the Game Is Over: Contribution, Indemnification and Set Off, S.C. LAW., Sept./Oct. 2001, at 28,
28-29; Randall, supra note 9, at 98o (encouraging the Alabama State Legislature and Alabama
Supreme Court to abrogate the no contribution rule because it violates "fundamental justice"); W.E.
Shipley, Annotation, Uniform ContributionAmong TortfeasorsAct, 34 A.L.R.2d io7, Iio7-o8 (954)
(explaining that a number of jurisdictions have adopted the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act, which abandoned the common law rule of no contribution); Alexandria E. Baez, Comment, Joint
Tortfeasors, Full Compensation, and the I,8oo Degree Crucible: Rekindling Rhode Island's Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act in the Aftermath of the Station Nightclub Fire, 12 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 386, 389 (2007); Megan P. Duffy, Note, Multiple Tortfeasors Defined by the
Injury: Successive Tortfeasor Liability After Payne v. Hall, 37 N.M. L. REv. 6o3, 608 (2oo7); see supra
Introduction, Part I, Part II.B.
122. Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 588 P.2d 1308, 1313 (Wash. 1978) ("That it
may be possible to assign a percentage figure to the relative culpability of multiple tort-feasors does
not detract from the preliminary fact that each tort-feasor's conduct was a proximate cause of an entire
indivisible injury."), superseded by statute, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.070 (201I), as recognized in
Kottler v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 963 P.2d 834, 838-39 (Wash. 1998).
123. Richard W. Wright, The Logic and Fairnessof Joint and Several Liability, 23 MEM. ST. U. L.
REV. 45, 59 (1992); see also Hager, supra note 6, at 103 ("[SL] embodies a paradox that the more
tortfeasors there are causing plaintiffs injury the less answerable each one of them becomes.").
124. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 588 P.2d at 1313-14 ("[Iif the rule of JSL is abandoned] a completely
faultless plaintiff could be forced to bear a portion of the loss if any tort-feasor should prove
financially unable to satisfy his proportionate share of the damages"); see also Am. Motorcycle Ass'n
v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d 899, 9o6 (Cal. 1978) ("One of the principal by-products of the joint and
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tortfeasors is infeasible, arbitrary, and unfair in and of itself;"' and
(6) a contribution (or SL) regime will result in more proceedings and
thus increase the cost of litigation to the victim and at best delay
collection or even worse, reduce it.126
All of these considerations are well known by now, although they
are often ignored by pro-defendants organizations."' This Article adds to
the fairness debate by taking a contractarian approach. Unlike Cooter
and Ulen, however, it argues that if situated behind a veil of uncertainty
the very tortfeasors that are said to suffer from the "unfair" results of the
no contribution rule would prefer the no contribution rule, or at least
would view it as fair as its alternatives, and might in fact agree to adopt
it."

III.

APPORTIONING LIABILITY FAIRLY: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH

The relation between just distribution of wealth and apportionment
rules is straightforward, indeed tautological: "Justice is concerned with
(proper) distributions over individuals. Distributions-or 'apportionments,'
'allotments,' 'allocations'-are 'just' when they are in some sense
appropriate; 'unjust' when they are not."' For some, a rule may be fair
or appropriate if it is efficient. To others, however, fairness and efficiency
are far from being synonyms. "[L]aws and institutions," noted Rawls,
"no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or
abolished if they are unjust."'3 o But even if "[j]ustice is the first virtue of
social institutions,"'' the question still remains: what is "just?" This Part
reviews one theory of justice.'32 It then undertakes to refute the

several liability rule is that it frequently permits an injured person to obtain full recovery for his
injuries even when one or more of the responsible parties do not have the financial resources to cover
their liability."). As a response to American Motorcycle the California legislature adopted Proposition
51, also known as the "deep pocket" initiative, which aimed "to eliminate the perceived unfairness of
imposing 'all the damage' on defendants who were 'found to share [only] a fraction of the fault."'
Miller v. Stouffer, II Cal. Rptr. 2d 454, 46o (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (citing DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc., 828
P.2d 14o, 146 (Cal. 1992)).
125. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 588 P.2d at 1313 ("Joint and several liability is premised upon
causation and the indivisibility of the harm caused. The simple feasibility of apportioning fault on a
comparative negligence basis, between plaintiff and defendant, does not render an indivisible injury
'divisible' for purposes of joint and several liability.").
126. See Landes & Posner 1980, supra note 28, at 529.

127. See Wright, supra note 7, at I161, 1163.
128. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
129. Robert Hockett, The Deep Grammar of Distribution:A Meta-Theory of Justice, 26 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1179, 1187 (2oo5); see also Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and CorrectiveJustice in the Tort
Law of Accidents, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 194-95 (2ooo) ("[T]o the extent we are concerned with
justice and fairness in tort law, we should be concerned more with matters of distributive justice-with
the fair apportionment of the burdens and benefits of risky activities.").
13o. RAWLS 1971, supra note 2, at 3; RAWLS REVISED, supra note 2, at 3.
131. RAWLS 1971, supra note 2, at 3; RAWLS REVISED, supra note 2, at 3.
132. The discussion of competing theories is deferred to Part IV, infra.
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misconception that the no contribution rule is "unjust." More
specifically, it draws on the "veil of uncertainty" literature to evaluate
the fairness of a number of legal regimes, including JSL with and without
fault-based contribution, SL, market-share liability and its sister, prorated liability. Building on Harsanyi and Landes and Posner, it shows
that self-interested individuals behind a veil, unaware of whether they
would be victims, tortfeasors, both, or neither, may in fact prefer the no
contribution rule.
A.

THE AsSUMPrIONS

i. The Veil of Uncertainty
In a series of articles, Harsanyi identified two sets of preferences
that each individual holds: subjective (or personal) preferences, and
moral preferences.'33 Subjective preferences give high weight to the
decisionmaker's own personal interests, taking under consideration her
endowments, status, skills, and other unique characteristics.'34 Thus, for
example, a wealthy person may prefer an income distribution or a tax
policy that favors the rich if she is egoistic, or one that benefits the poor
if she is altruistic. Similarly, an actor who is likely to be a defendant may
say to herself: "under a regime of SL my liability is curbed, whereas
under a regime of JSL I may be required to bear the entire burden. I thus
prefer a regime of SL."'" In making these choices the decisionmaker is
aware of her place in society (she knows whether she is poor or rich) and
her situation (she knows whether she is or is likely to be a victim or an
injurer), and she is motivated by her own set of beliefs (whether it is
egoism or altruism), which are the result of her own unique
circumstances, such as her upbringing, education, and so forth.
Subjective preferences (often) guide the individual but they cannot
serve as a moral judgment. They are just too narrowly tailored to serve
the decisionmaker's own personal needs and are therefore too biased. In
contrast, moral preferences or "moral value judgments""' indicate what
social order an individual would choose in a state of "complete
ignorance"' of her personal or relative position in the chosen social

133. Harsanyi 1975, supra note 19, at 598; Harsanyi 1955, supra note
supra note 19, at 434-35; see also supra note 19.

19,

at 315; Harsanyi 1953,

134. Harsanyi 1975, supra note 19, at 598; Harsanyi 1955, supra note 19, at 315; Harsanyi 1953,
supra note 19, at 434.
135. The example is based on Harsanyi 1975, supra note 19, at 598 (noting that an individual who

is wealthy under a capitalistic regime but "would be at best a minor government official" under
socialism would prefer capitalism but that such decision would be only a "judgment of personal
preference" as opposed to a "moral value judgment").
136. Harsanyi uses these terms interchangeably. See Harsanyi 1975, supra note 19, at 598; Harsanyi
1953, supra note 19, at 434-35.
137. Harsanyi 1953, supra note 19, at 434-35.
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order. In making her moral choice, the individual assumes that she has an
equal probability to obtain any of the positions in the new social
situation."' Moral preferences therefore give the same weight to the
interest of every member of society."' And in doing so they represent a
"'fair compromise' among them." 4 o In the above example, the individual
must choose a tax policy or an apportionment regime without knowing
whether she will be rich or poor, a tortfeasor, victim, both, or neither, but
assuming she has the same chance as other members to assume the
position of the best-off member, second-best off member, and so on, up
to the worst-off member. 4 '
Individuals' Risk Preferences
The availability of private low-cost insurance to tortfeasors and
victims requires that individuals behind the veil are treated as riskneutral actors. This is so because insurance, by compensating the policy
holder, eliminates the risk and thereby converts the risk averse actor into
one who is risk neutral. The conclusion relies on some simplifying
assumptions, but moral hazards aside, a person who purchased insurance
that would compensate her in case her car is stolen, would be indifferent
between engaging in a risky activity that would put her car in jeopardy,
such as parking on the street, and taking additional precaution, such as
2.

138. Harsanyi 1975, supra note 19, at 598; Harsanyi 1953, supra note 19, at 435 (recognizing that
"in the real world value judgments ... usually ... do not presuppose actual ignorance" and noting that
they can "still be interpreted as an expression of what sort of society one would prefer if one had an
equal chance of being 'put in the place of' any particular member of the society").
139. Harsanyi 1975, supra note 19, at 598-99; Harsanyi 1953, supra note 19, at 435.
140. Harsanyi 1955, supra note 19, at 315. But see Harsanyi 1975, supra note 19, at 598 (noting that

"Rawls's approach yields a moral theory in the contractarian tradition" and contrasting it with his own
approach).
141. Rawls' veil of ignorance-as opposed to his substantive difference rule-is very similar to
Harsanyi's veil of uncertainty, although the latter preceded the former. Harsanyi 1975, supra note 19,
at 595 ("In actual fact, this concept [Rawls' veil of ignorance] played an essential role in my own
analysis of moral value judgments, prior to its first use by Rawls in 1957."). For a review of Rawls'
substantive maximin (or difference) rule and reasons for rejecting it, see infra Part IV.B. According to
Rawls, a just society is one which people would agree on or contract for behind a veil. RAWLS 1971,
supra note 2, at 5, 17-22, 136-42; RAWLS REVISED, supra note 2, at 4, 15-19, 118-23; Michael I. Swygert
& Katherine Earle Yanes, A Unified Theory of Justice: The Integration of Fairnessinto Efficiency, 73
WASH. L. REV. 249, 260, 298-304 (1998). In this so called "original position," people are free from
special interests. They do not know their race, gender, religion (if any), social status, and intelligence.
Nor do they know whether they will be rich or poor, healthy or sick, injurers or victims. Put
differently, the original position is a position of uncertainty and therefore equality, in which free, selfinterested and rational individuals are divested of any specific characteristics (save their ability to
think and make decisions based on general information). Individuals do, however, know "the general
facts about human society. They understand political affairs and the principles of economic theory;
they know the basis of social organization and the laws of human psychology." RAWLS 1971, supra
note 2, at 137; RAWLS REVISED, supra note 2, at II9. Behind this veil of ignorance, individuals will be
able to choose a fair set of rules. Unaware of the personal attributes they will possess in the real world,
they would be free of biases and would thus be able to promulgate rules and allocate resources in a
way that would be acceptable to all and, by definition, just.
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parking in a gated garage. 142 By offering full compensation, the insurance
eliminates the risk and renders the insured indifferent or neutral to
risk.
The risk-neutrality assumption is also embedded in the celebrated
Hand formula.'" Liability in negligence arises when one does not take
cost-justified precautions.145 According to the algebraic terms of the
Hand formula "liability depends upon whether B [the burden of
precaution] is less than L [the severity of the harm] multiplied by P [the
6
probability of harm]: i.e., whether B < PL.""4
The formula compares the
costs of precaution to its benefits, but while the costs of precaution (B)
may be certain, the benefits from taking precautions (PL) are not. After
all, the accident may (at probability p) or may not (at a probability I-p)
happen, even without precautions. Yet, the Hand formula does not
calculate the expected utility from avoiding the accident as decision
theory requires. Instead it calculates the expected value of the accident
(PL), which is also a measure of expected utility from exercising care,
but only if one assumes risk neutrality.
Consider a textbook example where the cost of precaution is $ioo,
the probability that an accident would completely destroy a widget is i%,
and the loss (the widget's value) is $2oo. This is tantamount to a game
under which one needs to choose between (a) paying $ioo upfront, or
(b) paying nothing at a probability of 99% and paying $200 at a
probability of 1%. A risk-neutral actor is indifferent between paying the
expected value of the accident: $2 (200 x 1%) and taking her chances,
but she will not pay $ioo to avoid an accident with an expected value of
$2. The risk seeker would be willing to take the chance and would
decline to pay the $ioo upfront. The risk averse actor may be willing to
pay $ioo upfront (depending on the intensity of her aversion) just to
avoid the risk that she would have to pay $2oo. The Hand formula
assumes risk neutrality because it looks only at expected values. In the
142. Insurance companies take a number of actions in order to provide parties with incentives to
take care, including requiring insureds to share some of the cost (for example, in the form of a
deductible or a co-payment), requiring insureds to take certain protective measures (for example,
purchasing an alarm system) and exceptions from coverage where care was not taken. See also infra

note 144.

143. This assumes that co-payment and other related costs are trivial. Rizzo, supra note 104, at 656.
144. EcoNoMic ANALYSIS OF LAw, supra note i, at 167, 169 (noting that the risk-neutrality

assumption can be made in tort (but not in contract) because of the availability of "well developed
markets in insurance against personal injury and death"); Larry L. Chubb, Economic Analysis in the
Courts: Limits and Constraints,64 IND. L.J. 769, 774 (1989); Landes & Posner 1981, supra note 99, at
867. But see Rizzo, supra note l04, at 645 (criticizing the risk-neutrality assumption on the grounds
that it allows scholars "to deal with the simpler notion of expected wealth rather than the more
complex expected utility").
145. EcoNoMic ANALYSIS OF LAw, supra note I, at 200; Posner, supra note 25, at 73 ("The rules of

liability seem to have been broadly designed to bring about the efficient (cost-justified) level of
accidents and safety, or, more likely, an approximation thereto.").
146. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
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game of life it exempts from liability the person who did not take
precaution in case the accident occurred because the costs of precaution
($ioo) outweigh the expected benefits ($2). Note that if individuals were
infinitely risk averse, as Rawls assumes,'47 the victim in the example
would always take precaution because she would treat all risksincluding the risk that the accident would occur and the risk that the
tortfeasor would not be required to pay her damages-as certain.
Similarly, if the tortfeasor were infinitely risk averse, she would never
commit the tort in the first place because she would act as if the event
requiring her to pay the value of the widget would surely happen,
however unlikely the event may be. She would even alter her behavior in
order to avoid being sued for fear of a false positive: that she will be
found liable even though she was not. If Rawls' assumption was correct
and individuals were truly so risk averse, very few torts, if any, would
ever be committed. This is clearly not the case.
This Article assumes that individuals act as risk-neutral actors in the
tort context. One objection may be that this assumption is equally as
unrealistic as that made by Rawls. After all, the assumption made here,
that individuals are risk neutral and Rawls' assumption that they are
infinitely risk averse, are both factual assumptions, equally strong and
may be equally wrong. The risk-neutrality assumption, albeit factual, is
very different than that made by Rawls. Unlike Rawls, this Article does
not assume that individuals are inherently risk neutral. Rather, it
recognizes that different people may have varying risk preferences as
they indeed do. But it relies on the availability of low cost insurance to
assume that people, even those who are risk averse, behave as if they are
risk neutral.
The above explanation is a descriptive one. But the discussion about
individuals' risk preferences can also provide a normative account and
shed some light on the elusive "reasonable person" concept in the tort of
negligence. Under the nonalgebraic normative formulation of the tort of
negligence, liability is found if one did not act as a reasonable person
would under the circumstances. Perhaps, then, the hypothetical
"reasonable person" in torts is that person who behaves as if she were a
risk neutral. This reasonable person must invest in precautions up to the
expected value of the accident, even if a risk seeker would not invest in
precaution at all; but she does not have to invest more than the expected
value, even if a risk-averse person would. Viewed this way the negligence
rule can also be justified on contractarian grounds. A social contract, like
any contract, serves as a means to allocate risks between the parties. The
risk-neutrality assumption is thus only a manifestation that individuals
behind the veil, aware of the existence of low-cost insurance, are not

147. See infra notes 234, 236 and accompanying text.
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willing to impose on victims the damages caused by risk seekers who
invested in precautions below the PL level; and they ask, though they do
not require, that a risk averse person will not invest more than that level.
3. The Maximand
Following Harsanyi, the model assumes that behind the veil
individuals know that people are different, that they have different
preferences, goals, intellects and different attitudes towards risk, or, to
use an economic term, that they have a different utility function-what
Harsanyi referred to as "subjective preferences""4'-denoted as U,.
Uncertain of whom they will be after the veil is pierced, these individuals
will try to maximize their expected utility.'49 This means that if there are
n members in that society and each individual has an equal probability to
be the th individual, the chance to be the i member and face U is i/n.
For every individual the expected utility function that each person tries
to maximize behind the veil can be formulated as follows:
1
1
1
1
(I) EU= -U 1 +-U 2 +...+-Un=-(U+U
U)= Ui
2 +...
n
n
n
n
n,
The risk-neutrality assumption facilitates this expression even
further by allowing us to replace expected utility with a more
manageable maximand: expected value. But even with this new,
simplified maximand at hand one may still ask whether the veil can really
serve as a practical tool for devising rules for apportioning liability. After
all, the veil is applied only as a mental exercise. It is a theoretical tool
that philosophers use when they play "what if." In this game they must
pretend that they are members of society, that they are in the original
position, and act as if they do not know whether in the real world they
would be a man or a woman, poor or rich, black or white, and so on. It is
a theoretical tool because members of society do live in the real world
and because they do know who they are and act accordingly. Yet, when it
comes to promulgating liability rules people are truly behind a veil, at
least in the sense that they do not know if they will be victims or injurers;
and in case they are injurers, they do not know what fault level would be
assigned to them by the jury. One objection could be that in real life,
members of society are not truly behind the veil because they are aware
of their initial endowments. A defendants organization, for example,
would likely lobby for a contribution or SL rule to curb its members'
liability and thereby maximize their subjective preferences.' Such
148. See Harsanyi 1955, supra note 19, at 315.

149. This is Harsanyi's maximand. See Harsanyi 1975, supra note 19, at 598.
150. For example, the Wisconsin Civil Justice Council "was formed in early 2oo9 to represent
Wisconsin business interests on emerging civil litigation challenges before the Legislature" and its
"primary goal is to achieve fairness and equity." WiscoNsIN CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL, INC.,
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biases, however, can often be detected and should be ignored. In any
case, they should not play a role in deciding on a theoretical or "moral"
basis for adoption of a contribution rule as it cannot be justified on
contractarian grounds-as a scheme to which all members of society
would agree on. Rather, together with Harsanyi, "we can say that
[members of society] are expressing a moral value judgment, or that they
are expressing a moral preference for one of these social arrangements, if
they make a serious effort to disregard this piece of information [i.e.,
their own personal position], and make their choice as if they thought
they would have the same probability of taking the place of any
particular individual in society."" The model below attempts to do
exactly that.
B.

THE SIMPLE MODEL

If individuals do not know if they will be victims or joint tortfeasors,
what rule of apportionment would they choose? This sub-Part tries to
answer the question by providing a simple model with a number of
additional assumptions that are later relaxed. Specifically, it assumes that
there is one victim; n tortfeasors, each of whom is solvent; that litigation
costs are not prohibitive; and that litigation is certain. In this simple
world, under a regime of several liability, ex-post, each tortfeasor (n>i)
will pay aD where a, is the fault assigned by the jury to the i' tortfeasor
and D is the damage to the victim (Za,=i). For example, if there are two
tortfeasors, one is I% at fault and the other is 99% at fault, and the
id.
at
(last
visited
July
4,
2011);
http://www.wisciviljusticecouncil.org/about-us/
http://www.wisciviljusticecouncil.org/wwcms/wp-content/uploads/2oo9/o6/wcjc-memo-senateo615o9.pdf
(last visited July 4, 2011) (advocating for the abolishment of JSL). In addition, the American Academy
of Family Physicians ("AAFP") prides itself as "one of the largest national medical organizations,
representing more than 97,6oo family physicians, family medicine residents and medical students
nationwide." About Us, AAFP, http://www.aafp.org/online/en/home/aboutus.html?navid=about+us (last
visited July 4, 2011); Joint and Several Liablity: AAFP State Government Relations, AAFP
http://www.aafp.org/online/etc/medialib/aafp-org/documents/policy/state/liability-joint.Par.oooi.File.tmp/
stateadvocacyLiabilityJoint%20and%2oSeveral.pdf (last visited July 4, 2011) (calling for the
replacement of JSL with SL). Also, ATRA was founded by the American Council of Engineering
Companies, joined by the American Medical Association, and advocates for the abolishment of JSL
on the grounds that it "is neither fair, nor rational, because it fails to equitably distribute liability. The
rule allows a defendant only minimally liable for a given harm to be forced to pay the entire judgment,
where the co-defendants are unable to pay their share." Joint and Several Liabilty Rule Reform,
ATRA, http://www.atra.org/issues/index.php?issue=7345 (last visited July 4, 2011); see also Edward D.
Cavanagh, Contribution, Claim Reduction, and Individual Treble Damage Responsibility: Which Path
to Reform of Antitrust Remedies?, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1277, 1280-81 (1987) ("Unfortunately, the
congressional debates regarding the merits and demerits of contribution and claim reduction have
been obscured by self-interest."); Leslie, supra note 120, at 750 ("[M]any firms lobbied Congress to
create a statutory right of contribution.").
151. Harsanyi 1975, supra note 19, at 598; see also Harsanyi 1955, supra note 19, at 316 ("[In either

case [whether the individual does not in fact knows his choice or disregard it] an impersonal choice
(preference) of this kind can in a technical sense be regarded as a choice between 'uncertain'
prospects.").
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damage to the victim is $ioo, then the first will pay $i and the second
$99. If behind the veil members know that they will be tortfeasors but
they do not know what percentage of fault would be assigned to them
(1% or 99% in the example) then ex-ante their expected liability will be:
1
1
1
I
D
(2) ELn= -aD+-a 2 D+...+-aD=a Dn

n

n

n

n

In the example above, each tortfeasor knows that she has a 50%
chance to be the first tortfeasor and if so she will be assigned i % of fault
and pay $i; and there is a 50% chance that she will be the second
tortfeasor in which case she will be 99% at fault and pay $99. Her
expected liability is therefore equal to $50 (50% x $I + 50% x $99).
Under a pro-rated regime each tortfeasor pays i/n of the damage (in
the example above, each pays $5o), which is also equal to their expected
liability behind the veil, as shown by Equation (3):
1D I D
ID
1 nD
D

(3)ELn = !n

n

+nn -+..+--

nn

=- Z
n

n

=-

n

In a market-share regime, liability is not pro-rated or based on fault,
but rather on the market share possessed by each tortfeasor, denoted by
m,. In this truncated version of the tort of negligence the causation
element is missing. For policy reasons, liability arises if one breached her
duty, even if her breach did not cause the victim's injury.' To illustrate,
if the tortfeasor in the above example who was 99% at fault had only
m,=30% of the market, she would only be liable for 30% of the damage,
or more generally m;D ( m1=i). Her expected liability, however, is the
same as in the case of pro-rated and several liability:
1
111"D
D
m;D
(4) ELn = mID+-m 2 D+...+-mD = I
n
n
n
n n
Behind the veil a tortfeasor does not know if she will be the
competitor with the high market share (70%) or the one with the low
market share (30%). But she knows that regardless of her fault she has a
50% chance to be liable for 30% of the damage and a 50% chance to be
liable for 70% of the damage. She therefore knows that her expected
liability will be $50 (50% x $70 + 50% x $30), or

$100/2.

JSL with and without contribution yields the same expected liability.
Under JSL with contribution ex-ante, each tortfeasor's expected liability
is equal to D/n, but ex-post she pays only a,D. It is true that a tortfeasor
may be required to pay the entire damage, D ($ioo in the example) to
the victim, but since the parties are solvent and litigation is cheap and
certain, such party will be able to receive contribution and her liability
152. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 6o7 P.2d 924, 936-37 (Cal. 1980); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 539 N.E.2d lo69, 1075 (N.Y. 1989).
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will be brought down to aD. To analyze the no contribution rule, assume
the worst case scenario to a tortfeasor: the situation in which she will be
required to pay the entire damage by herself. Unlike the contribution
rule, ex-post this means that the unlucky tortfeasor will bear the entire
amount and the other tortfeasors will be off the hook. In the example
above, if the victim decided to recover her damages from the tortfeasor
who is only i% responsible, the latter will bear ioo% of the burden, and
the tortfeasor who is 99% at fault will get off scot-free. But the expected
liability is the same as in the previous regime. Behind the veil the
tortfeasor does not know what would be her fault level, ai, nor does she
know if she will be required to pay the entire amount. She has a i/n
chance to pay the entire amount and a (i-i/n) chance to pay nothing,
which brings her expected liability to Din:
D
1
1
- D +(1 - -)0 = (5) EL,
n
n
n
In this example each tortfeasor has a 50% chance to get sued and
pay the entire amount of $ioo, and a 50% chance of being off the hook.
Their expected liability is thus $50. It is the same expected liability that
tortfeasors behind the veil face under JSL with contribution, pro-rated
liability, market-share liability, and SL. In this sense, these regimes are
therefore equally fair. Behind the veil the tortfeasors would be
indifferent between the different legal schemes.
Ex-ANTE AND Ex-PosT LIABILITY
Pro-Rated
Market
Several
Liability
Liability I Share
D/n
DIn

TABLE i:

Ex-Ante
Payment
Ex-Post
payment

t

UNDER DIFFERENT REGIMES

JSL with
Contribution

I

JSL with No
Contribution

Din

Din

aD

D or o

Table I demonstrates why SL, market-share liability, pro-rated
liability, and JSL with contribution serve as social insurance policies to
wrongdoers. In these regimes the burden of liability is distributed among
all the tortfeasors. Each of these legal schemes provides insurance
against the risk that one tortfeasor will have to pay the entire damages,
although their terms are different; for example, under SL the defendant's
"deductible" is aiD, under market-share liability it is mD and so on. In
contrast, the no contribution rule does not provide such insurance. The
risk that one tortfeasor will be required to pay everything is not spread
among the tortfeasors. But this result is justified. It is not clear why
victims (and society) should subsidize insurance to those who wronged
them. This social insurance is unnecessary also because the tortfeasors
can insure themselves if they wish to do so. It is also a form of a
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mandatory insurance that would even be unacceptable to some
tortfeasors. Recall our example of two tortfeasors who jointly caused the
victim an indivisible harm of $ioo. The tortfeasors would be indifferent
(if they are risk neutral) or even prefer (if they are risk seekers) a regime
of JSL with no contribution. In the latter case, they would prefer to take
their chances (each hoping to be the one who pays nothing) rather than
pay a certain amount of $50 (under several or pro-rated liability).

C.

COSTS
Assume now that transaction costs (e.g., litigation costs) are positive
and equal to k per trial per party, but that they are not prohibitive
(D/n>k). The other assumptions remain. If each party bears her own
litigation costs, the expected liability under SL, market-share liability,
pro-rated liability, and JSL with contribution is the same: k + Din 53 ; and
the total litigation costs would reach (n + I)k.S4 This is because under
market share and SL n proceedings will result. Under JSL with
contribution, litigation will be equally or more costly. It is true that the
victim can recover her damages from one tortfeasor, but then n-I parties
will be required to pay "their share" to redistribute the burden among
the tortfeasors."' In the case of ten tortfeasors, the one who paid the
victim would seek recovery from the remaining nine tortfeasors.
Under a no contribution regime, on the other hand, the expected
liability would be substantially lower:
1
1
Dk
(6) EL, = -(D+k)+(1--)0
= -+n
n
n n
Because litigation is certain and costly and all parties are solvent,
the victim will sue only one tortfeasor (at a probability of I/n).
Equation (6) implies that the more tortfeasors involved, the more
efficient the no contribution rule becomes compared to the alternative
regimes. The intuition is simple. In a no contribution regime the victim
can recover from one party only. She does not need to sue each and
every tortfeasor, and because contribution is not available, the payment
to the victim does not generate a secondary wave of litigation. In this
respect the no contribution rule is not only efficient, it is more just. If in
TRANSACTION

153. The expected liability in Equations (2)-(4) can be rewritten by adding k as a certain cost that
would be incurred in addition to the compensation that the tortfeasor will be required to pay.
Equation (4), for example, can be rewritten as follows:
n

n

mD=k+D

mD=k+

mD+...+

(4)ELn=k+-m,D+

n

n,

n

154. This assumes that the victim sues each tortfeasor for her share. If the victim recovers her
entire damages only from a subset of the tortfeasors, under a JSL regime with contribution the paying
tortfeasors' cost and total expected cost could be higher.
155. The pro-rated regime enjoys a cost-reducing feature absent in market-share liability, several
liability, and JSL with contribution, because it is easier to pro-rate than to determine fault or market
share.
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the Simple Model individuals were indifferent between the alternative
regimes behind the veil, where litigation costs are positive, they would in
fact prefer the no contribution rule because it minimizes their expected
cost. It will undoubtedly leave most of them with more resources while
still allowing risk-averse parties to insure themselves using market
mechanisms.
Finally, the no contribution rule reduces the perverse outcomes that
can result from a "tortfest.""' The term refers to the fact that the
expected liability of each tortfeasor decreases as the number of
tortfeasors increase (Din in the simple model). If litigation costs are
positive they may become prohibitive if n increases up to the point that
filing a suit would not be profitable (k>D/n). Assume for example that
the victim considers filing a suit against two tortfeasors, each equally at
fault, who caused her a damage of $ioo, and the cost to file a suit is $6o.
Under a rule of JSL with no contribution the victim will file one suit for a
net gain of $40 (ioo - 60). But under a SL regime she will not file a suit
because each suit represents a net loss of $io (50 - 6o).'" The result
cannot be justified morally. It is "perverse" because it exempts from
liability a tortfeasor who was found liable for the entire damage simply
because other tortfeasors happened to join her in harming the victim.
D.

INSOLVENCY

Assume that each individual's solvency level, defined as her ability
to pay the maximum amount for which she can potentially be found
liable, is denoted by s, such that o s, I (i.e., if s,<I the irh tortfeasor is
insolvent). Under a SL regime and assuming that litigation is certain and
costless, ex-post each tortfeasor will pay sa,D. The tortfeasor who jointly
caused a $ioo damage and is responsible for 99% of the damage will pay
at most $9.90 if she is only io% solvent (io% x 99% x oo). Ex-ante,
however, the tortfeasor does not know her fault (a,) or solvency (si)
levels. She does not know if she will be the person who would be I % or
99% at fault and whether she would be able to fully pay the judgment
against her, 50% or io% thereof. Thus her expected liability behind the
veil is:
1
1

(7) EL, =-s, (aD) +-s 2 (

D) +...+-s,, (a,,D)=-

sia,

2
n :-I
n
n
n
The victim will recover from each tortfeasor only sa,D and thus the
victim's total expected recovery will be:

156. For a similar but different use of this term, see Wright, supra note 123, at 59.
157. If each of the parties is not fully solvent so that each can pay only 50% of the damage, the
same result would arise under JSL with contribution.
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(8)'58 ERE = s, (aD)+s2 (a2D)+...+s(a,,D)= Djsjat
i-1

As noted above, the analysis with regard to proportionate marketshare liability is identical with the exception that a, will not be a measure
of the ih tortfeasor's fault but a measure of her market share (previously
denoted by mi).

If liability is severally pro-rated, then each tortfeasor's expected
liability behind the veil and the victim's expected recovery can be
denoted as follows:
I D
I
D
1
D
D "
(9) EL = -s 1( )+-s 2 ( )+...+-Sn(
2
S

n

n
n
n
n
n
n
D
D
D
Dn
(10)159 ER, =s,(-)+s2 (-)+...+S (-)=
s, <
n
n
n
n

D

Under a regime of JSL each tortfeasor is liable for the entire
damage, D. The payoffs of the parties with and without contribution are
thus a function of both the fault and solvency levels of each tortfeasor
and they are summarized in the Technical Appendix. By denoting 6, as
the probability for the ith branch in Diagram 3 in the Technical Appendix,
it is possible to derive the expected liability of T behind the veil and to
show that it is the same under a rule of contribution and no contribution
and is equal to:
(II) EL,

7

1
=-I
J.D+ IZ
4

2

j__5

D(sj.+s 2 j)

This means that even when parties behind the veil are unaware of
whether they are tortfeasors or victims, at least from a fairness
standpoint they should be indifferent between the two regimes. The
victim recovers the same amount under both legal schemes, and the
tortfeasor, ex-ante, unaware of whether she will be more (T) or less (T)
solvent, expects to pay the same amount.
E.

UNCERTAINTY IN LITIGATION

This sub-Part relaxes the Simple Model's assumption that litigation
is certain. It begins by investigating the payoffs that parties face behind
the veil when the probability that each tortfeasor will be found liable is
independent from, or uncorrelated with, others, as in the case of two
independent acts that resulted in an indivisible harm. The fact that the
158. Equation (8) implies that the victim will not fully recover her damages. Assuming that at least
one tortfeasor is not fully solvent (i.e., that there exists si such that ski and hence siai<ai), and
because ai =i, then Jsiai<I and therefore Dysiai<D.
159. Assuming that at least one tortfeasor is not fully solvent, it follows from the fact that s,<i,
Es,<n and thus (D s,)/n<D.
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victim can prove and win her case against one tortfeasor does not mean
that she will be able to prove her case against the other tortfeasor. Given
the uncertainty of the litigation-and assuming it is not prohibitive and
that the parties are solvent-the victim will try to recover from all
tortfeasors.
Under a SL regime each tortfeasor has a probability p, that she will
be found liable and pay aD, and a probability (i - p,) that she will be
found not liable (false negative) and pay nothing. The expected liability
of the several tortfeasors and the victim's expected recovery are
therefore:
(12) EL,= p

aD

n

(I3) ER, =

piaD

Because behind the veil tortfeasors do not know the percentage of
fault that will be assigned to them, they face an expected liability of:
1
1
1D
p, (a, D) + -p 2(a 2D) +... + - p,, (a,,D) = - pca,
EL
()
n
n
n
n jConsider the case of two tortfeasors, one is 30% at fault and the
other is 70%, and assume that the probability that each will be found
liable is 50%. If the damage to the victim is $ioo then ex-post, if found
liable, one will pay $3o and the other $70. But ex-ante their expected
liability is $15 (50% x 30% x ioo) and $35 (50% x 70% x 1oo)
respectively. And if behind the veil a tortfeasor does not know if she will
be assigned 30% or 70%, her expected liability is

$25

(

x 15 + 2 x 35).

Note that the ratio of the expected liabilities ELIEL, (15/35) reflects
their fault ratio (30/70). But this is not always the case. If, for example,
a,=20%, a,=8o%, p,=io% and p,=6o%, then the tortfeasors' expected
liabilities are $2 (1o% x 20% X Io) and $48 (60% x 8o% x ioo), and
their expected liability ratio (2/48) is different than their respective fault
ratio (2o/8o).'6
Under a proportionate pro-rata regime, the expected liability of a
tortfeasor and the expected recovery behind the veil is:
D"
D
1 D
1
D
1
(15) EL = p
+ P2
i
=
i
n
n n
n
n
n
n j-1

D

D
(16) ER1 = p,

n

+ P2

n

1

D"

12

12,y

n

n ;_1

i

16o. Behind the veil, however, not knowing whether she will be T, or T,, her expected liability is
still the same: $25 (1 x 2 + Vhx 48).
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Diagram I describes the possible apportionments under a regime of
JSL (with and without contribution) in the case of two tortfeasors where
the probability to prove liability is uncorrelated. There are four possible
outcomes. In the first, the victim may win her case against both
defendants (at probability pyP
2), and then she may either recover from
one only (branches I and 2 in Diagram I) or from both according to their
fault level (branch 3), or in any ratio, y,, she may deem fit such that y, a,
(branch 4). Regardless of her choice, however, because the defendants
are solvent, if contribution is allowed each will pay no more than her
fault level, a;D. In the second, third, and fourth scenarios (branches 5-7),
the victim wins only against one of the defendants and fully recovers her
damages from the latter, or neither. Contribution in these situations is
not a possibility.
DIAGRAM I: APPORTIONMENT WITH UNCORRELATED PROBABILITIES'

PreContribution

PostContribution

D

o
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o
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(7)
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It is easy to show that the expected liability behind the veil under a
regime of JSL and SL (or JSL with contribution) is the same and equal
to:
(17)"'

EL_

-

2

D(p, + P2 -P I P 2 )

161. Branches ()-(4) can be collapsed into one branch, where each tortfeasor pays a certain
fraction, f, such that 'f,=i.
162. This result is independent of the probability assigned to branches 1-4.
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If the probabilities are correlated-if winning (at a probability p)
against one defendant also means that the victim wins against the
second-then there are only two possibilities described in Diagram 2
below. Either the victim wins and fully recovers her damages (branches
1-4), or she loses against both and recovers nothing (branch 5).
DIAGRAM 2: APPORTIONMENT WHEN PROBABILITIEs ARE CORRELATED
PostPreContribution Contribution
T
T
T1
T,
(I)

D

o

aD

a2D

o

D

a,D

a2D (2)

TwT,,

p

TL,T,L
(I-p)

aD a2D

-------------

(3)

yD

y 2D

a,D

(4)

o

o

N/A

aD

(5)

If contribution is available, at the end of the day the parties will
always pay according to their respective fault level. But whether liability
is apportioned under JSL with or without contribution, the expected
liability behind the veil is the same and equal to:
1
(18) ERv = - pD
2
The conclusion is thus that even when litigation is uncertain, JSL
with no contribution is as fair as any other contribution regime. In both,
the expected liability is the same for tortfeasors behind the veil.
However, in a recent book titled Tort Law and Economics,
Professors Kornhauser and Revesz compare the different apportionment
regimes but reach a different conclusion.' 63 When it comes to
apportionment of liability between the tortfeasors, they argue, "joint and
several liability performs badly: [I]t places a disproportionate burden on
the defendant with the smaller share of the liability, except when the
plaintiff's probabilities of success are perfectly correlated."' 6 ' The authors
provide the following example as a support for their argument. 6
Consider a situation in which a victim seeks to recover her $ioo from two
163. Kornhauser & Revesz, supra note 103, at
164. Id.
165. Id. at 126-27.

126.
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defendants, Row and Column. Row and Column are 25% and 75% at
fault respectively, and the plaintiff's independent probabilities to win is
p,=50%. Assume further that if both defendants are liable, the plaintiff
will recover from Row and Column according to their faults. In this case
there are four scenarios with equal probability of 25%: the plaintiff
(i) wins against both and recovers from Row $25 and Column $75
(branch 3 in Diagram I); (2) loses to Column but wins against Row in
which case Row pays $ioo (branch 5 in Diagram I); (3) loses to Row but
wins against Column in which case Column pays $ioo (branch 6 in
Diagram I); or (4) loses to both (branch 7 in Diagram I). The expected
liabilities of Row and Column are thus 31.25 and 43-75, respectively.'"
Based on this example, Kornhauser and Revesz conclude that: "[W]hile
Row's contribution to harm is only one-third [25/75] that of Column's,
her expected liability is about three-quarters that of Column's
[31.25/43-751-" 6
The authors' conclusion is correct but only if one assumes that the
parties already know who they are, that the tort was already committed,
and fault has been assigned. This version of the veil, however, cannot
serve as a basis for a fairness analysis. It is too "thin." It is premised on
an ex-post analysis and it ignores the prospective nature of the legislative
process and the common law. When the legislator or judge pronounces
the law, its force is mainly prospective. Actors are often not aware
whether they will be future victims, tortfeasors, both, or neither. And
even if one does know what her position is or is likely to be, a moral
judgment requires members of society to "make a serious effort to
disregardthis piece of information."" If one does not know whether she
will be Row or Column-or disregards this information-she has an

equal probability to face an expected liability of $31.25 or $43-75. Thus,
according to Equation (17), the expected liability behind the veil is the
same as it would be under a regime of JSL with contribution: $37.50.9

F.

A FEW WORDS ON EFFICIENCY AND LOBBYING
The model can shed some light not only on the fairness of the no
contribution rule but also on its efficiency. Recall that Landes and
Posner's conclusion that the no contribution rule is superior was not free
from doubts. The authors identified two important "economic benefits of
contribution in joint-care" that caused them, at least initially, to question

166. Row has 25% chance to pay $25 and 25% chance to pay $1oo (25% x 25 + 25% x 1oo = 31-25),
and Column has 25% chance to pay $75 and 25% chance to pay $1oo (25% x 75 + 25% x 00 = 43-75).

The authors mistakenly note that Column's expected liability is $42-75.
167. Kornhauser & Revesz, supra note 103, at 127.
168. Harsanyi 1975, supra note 19, at 598.

169. This assumes that the parties are solvent (as implied by Kornhauser and Revesz's example).
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17
their own conclusion.o
One concern was the insurance feature of the
contribution rule. According to the authors, because "contribution is a
form of liability insurance" and because some tortfeasors "may be risk
averse, and they would gain from a rule of contribution," then it is not
clear whether "the gain [to tortfeasors from insurance] would exceed the
extra costs of administrating such a rule."'71 It seems, however, that the
insurance "benefit" identified by the authors is not a benefit at all. There
is simply no reason to use the tort machinery to create a social insurance
for wrongdoers (or victims). In fact, some tortfeasors would prefer not to
purchase any insurance or would be indifferent to it altogether (if they
are not averse to risk). And those who would like to purchase such
insurance can do so in the open market. 2
The other benefit identified by the authors is informational. The
argument is that "[u]nder a rule of no contribution each prospective
tortfeasor is uncertain what share of the expected accident cost he will
bear;" and if this uncertainty causes her to underestimate her expected
liability an inefficient allocation of resources may result. 3 The authors
note, however, that the problem is unavoidable since the parties may
underestimate the number of tortfeasors.174 To illustrate, assume a jointcare scenario where two tortfeasors, T, and T., must take precaution at a
cost of $55 and $35, respectively, to avoid a $ioo damage. In this
situation, T will take precaution (35<50), and knowing this, T, will take
precaution (55<ioo). But if the two tortfeasors thought that a third
person may pay the damages, then each would act as if her expected
liability is $33-33 (believing there is a 1/3 chance she would need to pay
the victim $ioo). In this situation, neither T, nor T, will take precaution

(55, 35>33-33).

However, the problem can be remedied, at least partially, by the
common law. In England the satisfaction of a judgment by a third
unrelated party barred its enforcement against any of the tortfeasors.'75
The plaintiff was entitled to one compensation regardless of who paid
it. 7 6 In the U.S. the single-recovery rule was also applied, but only when
the judgment was paid by one who was herself actually liable for the
wrong. Thus, if one joint-tortfeasor paid the plaintiff, the payment was
final and released all other joint tortfeasors."' But if the judgment was
See infra notes 173-79 and accompanying text.
171. Landes & Posner 1980, supra note 28, at 531; see also Cooter & Ulen, supra note 99, at 1o98.
170.

172. The authors themselves seem to allude to this point elsewhere. See Landes & Posner 1981,
supra note 99, at 867-68 (arguing that tort law should not perform an insurance function).
173. Landes & Posner 198o, supra note 28, at 530.
174. Id.
175. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, at 330.

176. Id.
177. Id. at 331-32. For decisions that seem to support this view, see Carroll v. Kerrigen, 197 A. 127,
127-28 (Md. 1938); Phillips Sheet & Tin Plate Co. v. Griffith, 12o N.E. 207, 2o8 (Ohio 1918); Brimer v.
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satisfied voluntarily-even if under a mistaken belief of liability-by one
not in fact liable, it did not prevent the plaintiff from recovering again
from those who otherwise were liable.17 Prosser and Keeton explain that
the reason for the rule is the result of the confusion that surrounded joint
tortfeasors.'7 ' But whatever its reason, it had an important benefit. The
rule reduced the ex-ante uncertainty about n. Even if there was a chance
that a stranger would volunteer or mistakenly satisfy a judgment, the rule
assured the tortfeasor that her chance to be sued behind the veil is still
i/n and, therefore, her expected liability remained the same (Din or $50
in the above example).
The model and the insurance feature embedded in contribution
regimes can also shed some light on a different yet related debate:
whether states should delete JSL from their books altogether and replace
it with several liability. In this debate, lobbying plays an important role.
It has been reported that "organizations representing prospective
defendants have attempted, with some success, to eliminate or limit [JSL]
and to replace it with proportionate several (separate) liability. "'
Assume for a moment that the assumptions of the Simple Model apply so
that parties are solvent and litigation is cheap and certain. In this case,
the expected liability of all tortfeasors under JSL with and without
contribution is the same as SL, Din. Yet, even here defendant
organizations would likely prefer the contribution rule over the no
contribution rule. The reason is that under a no contribution rule a riskaverse tortfeasor will need to purchase an insurance policy with a
broader recovery up to D (recall that she faces a i/n chance to pay the
entire damage, D). Under JSL with contribution on the other hand, the
payment that a tortfeasor (or her insurance company) is expected to pay
may be the same, but the variance is much smaller in the case of
contribution. Liability is limited to D/n."'

Interestingly, both opponents and proponents of JSL and SL raise
fairness concerns. Proponents of JSL argue that it is unfair that the risk
of identifying the defendants and establishing liability and recovery falls

Scheibel, 290 S.W. 5, 6 (Tenn. 1926).
178. Deatley's Adm'r v. Phillips, 243 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Ky. 1951); Carroll, 197 A. at 128.
179. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, at 331-32.

18o. Steenson, supra note 8, at 845-46 ("In the 2003 session, the Minnesota Legislature, motivated
by pressure from municipal, business, and insurance interests, amended its joint and several liability
rules for the fourth time."); Victor J. Torres, Tegman v. Accident & Medical Investigations, Inc.: The
Re-Modification of Modified Joint and Several Liability by Judicial Fiat, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 729,
740-43 (2oo6) (reviewing the legislative process that led to the enactment of Washington's Tort
Reform Act of 1986); ATRA, supra note 8 (stating ATRA's position and listing states' reforms); see
also supra notes 8, 15o and accompanying text.
181. Wright, supra note 7, at 1142, 1147-48.
182. See supra note 157 and accompanying text (discussing some of the perverse outcomes that
may result under a SL regime).
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on the innocent party: the victim.' Proponents of SL argue that it is
unfair that a defendant bears more than her "fair" share.'8, Even if one is
initially convinced by proponents of a SL regime, it seems that behind
the veil of ignorance JSL presents a better alternative. Potential riskaverse defendants will be able to insure themselves. Those who do not
wish to purchase insurance will not have to subsidize those who do. It is
true that insurance premiums may be higher without such a subsidy, but
absent a market failure or any evidence to the contrary, it is not clear
that such a subsidy is justified. Many, Holmes among them, would argue
that the presumption is against subsidy.'
IV.

COMPETING THEORIES OF JUSTICE: RE-EVALUATING THE

ASSUMPTIONS
A. CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
The reason that led most states to change their laws and replace the
no contribution rule is grounded in distributive justice. The concern was
that the distribution of liability was apportioned unfairly'" -an argument
that this Article seeks to prove faulty. But distributive justice is only one
facet of the fairness debate. Some, like Professor Coleman, have taken
the view that "at its core, tort law is a matter of corrective justice.""" The
question then arises whether the argument pressed in this Article-that
the no contribution rule is as fair as its alternatives-can be justified in
corrective justice. This in turn requires an understanding of what
corrective justice is. Professor Coleman distinguishes between three
conceptions of corrective justice."8 Under the annulment conception,
"the point of corrective justice is to eliminate, rectify, or annul wrongful
(or unjust) losses."'S The annulment conception requires that wrongful
losses be rectified but it does not "impose this responsibility on anyone in

183. For a review of the arguments that shapes the JSL/SL debate, see generally Wright, supra
note 7.
184. Id.
185. See infra note 299 and accompanying text.
186. See supra Parts I, II.B.
187. JULES L. COLEMAN, RIsKS AND WRONGs 367 (1992); id. at 12 ("[A]t its core tort law seeks to
repair wrongful losses" and "implements corrective justice."); id. at 209 ("[T]he best explanation of
current Anglo-American tort law sees the practice primarily in terms of its efforts to meet these
demands of justice-what I call corrective justice."); id. at 304 (arguing that "corrective justice is
embodied in the structural and substantive core of tort law"); see also ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF
PRIVATE LAW 56-83 (1995); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 152
(1973). But see Keating, supra note 129, at 194-95 ("[T]o the extent we are concerned with justice and
fairness in tort law, we should be concerned more with matters of distributive justice-with the fair
apportionment of the burdens and benefits of risky activities-and less concerned than we have been
with matters of corrective justice-less preoccupied with questions of wrongdoing and rectification.").
188. COLEMAN, supranote 187, at 3o6.
189. Id.
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particular."" It does not say by whom and how the loss should be
repaired. 9 ' In fact, "wrongdoing creates no special reason for the
wrongdoer to do anything."' The focus is solely on the loss which must
be rectified,' 93 although it does require that by rectifying a loss one does
not create another wrongful loss.'"
A different conception of corrective justice is the relational concept.
Under the relational concept, "[i]f one person has wronged another, then
corrective justice imposes a duty on the wrongdoer to rectify his
wrong,"" but "not the losses that might result as a consequence."' As
Coleman notes, the difference between the two conceptions can be
substantial." For example, if A runs B down and causes her a $ioo
injury, under the annulment conception A or someone else would be
required to pay B her $ioo loss. Under the relation conception, on the
other hand, the wrong-as opposed to the loss-could be rectified if A
apologizes, makes a public statement, or is imprisoned.'9 Repairing the
wrong is simply not the same as repairing the loss. The mixed conception,
as the name suggests, builds on both the annulment and relational
conceptions. Like the annulment conception, it focuses on the loss, but it
also creates a relation. It imposes a duty on the tortfeasor to repair the
losses she caused and for which she is responsible.'"
In the case of multiple tortfeasors who cause an indivisible harm,
the annulment and relation concepts pose no real challenge to the
conclusion that JSL with no contribution is as fair or just as its
alternatives. Under JSL with or without contribution, the victim is
compensated. The loss, and thus the wrong, is rectified. In fact, the
expected recovery to the victim is the same under both rules.'" The
mixed conception, the one pressed by Coleman,o' however, does not
focus on repairing the loss only. Rather, it creates a duty running from
the tortfeasor to the victim. One may thus claim that a tortfeasor who is
99% at fault has a duty to rectify 99% of the damage she caused and that
such duty cannot be satisfied by the tortfeasor who is only i% at fault. It

190. Id. at 309.
191. Id. at 312.

192. Id. at 313.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 3o6.

Id. at 314-15 (emphasis added).
196. Id. at 320.
195.

197. Id. at 313-15,320-21.

198. Id. at 321.
i99. Id. at 322-24.
2oo. See supra Part III.B-E. Even if rectifying the loss does not rectify the wrong, a judgment-a
statement of liability-may be considered enough. Note that under certain conditions (for example, if
JSL with contribution may raise some of the perverse outcomes discussed supra Part III.C), a
corrective justice approach may even prefer the no contribution rule.
201. COLEMAN, supra note 187, at 318-i9.
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may even be argued that requiring a tortfeasor who is only i % at fault to
pay ioo% of the damage may rectify one wrongful loss: that caused by
the tortfeasors to the victim; but may create a new wrongful loss:
requiring one tortfeasor to pay more than her fair share.
These arguments, however, are flawed for two main reasons. To
begin with, the liability of each of the tortfeasors is for the entire injury.
It is only that in relation to one another, one is i % at fault and the other
is 99% at fault. Because each of the tortfeasors is responsible for the
entire wrong, each has a duty based in corrective justice to rectify the
loss. Secondly, a duty to rectify is not a duty to pay. An equation of the
two blurs the distinction between what Coleman refers to as grounds and
modes of rectification. 2 Indeed, as Coleman notes, "[e]ven if the injurer
has the duty to repair [that is grounded] in justice, it does not follow that
justice requires that the duty be discharged by the injurer."'" Coleman
illustrates the point by hypothesizing that if a third person (Donald
Trump) pays the injurer's debt, no injustice would be done." Put
differently, according to Coleman corrective justice gives rise to a duty
running from the injurer to the victim, but it does not require the injurer
to pay the victim.2 s
Coleman goes even further, noting that even if the third party who
has no contractual relation or understanding with the tortfeasor, on his
own and without encouragement rectified the victim's loss, such payment
would satisfy the injurer's duty and thus corrective justice.'

Under this

view, requiring one tortfeasor to bear the entire burden can be grounded
in corrective justice. Even if one tortfeasor has a duty in corrective justice
to compensate the victim, it does not follow, to use Coleman's words,
that "justice requires that the duty be discharged by the injurer."" And
if it can be satisfied by a third party who is not an injurer, it can surely be
rectified by another injurer who was found liable for the entire harm. In
fact, this Article argues for a narrower view than that proposed by
Coleman. It would allow any of the tortfeasors or a third party with
whom they have a contractual relation to satisfy the duty. But unlike
Coleman, it would not allow any third party to satisfy the tortfeasor's
duty to rectify. If such payment by a third party would extinguish the
duty of the tortfeasors to rectify the victim, this would reduce the
tortfeasors' expected liability behind the veil and result in an inefficiency
that the "American rule"'O once sought to avoid.
202.

For the distinction, see id. at 285-303, 326-27.

203.
204.
205.
2o6.

Id. at 327.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
2o8. The "American rule" allows the victim to go after the tortfeasors even if she was paid by a
third party. See supra Part III.F.
207.
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B. RAWLS' THEORY OF JUSTICE
A leading moral theory, one which has been used by at least one
state supreme court2" and a number of scholars 2 o to justify the
abrogation of the no contribution rule and its replacement by a right of

contribution, is Rawls' "Theory of Justice."'
The Theory offers a
procedure followed by a substantive account that is supposed to ensure a
just society."' The procedure adopted by Rawls is similar to that adopted
by Harsanyi: a just society is one which adopts rules that people would
agree on or contract for behind a veil." Unlike Harsanyi, however,
substantively Rawls argues that in the original position, behind the veil,
members of society would agree on rules based on two principles that he
deems just and fair: (I) equal liberty to all; and (2) a distribution of
209. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Whitehead & Kales Co., 566 S.W.2d 466, 474 (Mo. 1978) (en bane)
(holding that the principle of fairness, as defined by Rawls, compels the adoption of a contribution rule).
2io. See, e.g., Cooter & Ulen, supra note 99, at 1o99 n.140; Langmore & Prentice, supra note 95, at

lo65.
211. Rawls' self-proclaimed motivation was to provide an alternative account of justice that is
superior to utilitarianism. RAWLS 1971, supra note 2, at viii; RAWLS REVISED, supra note 2, at xi, xviii.

Utilitarianism is often equated with maximizing happiness. According to utilitarian theory in its
crudest form, an action, an individual, or a law is "moral" or "good" or "just" if it increases total
happiness. J. S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM IO (1863). Happiness, in turn, is loosely defined as "the greatest
possible surplus of pleasure over pain." HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 413 (7th ed. 1907).

It is achieved when one satisfies her preferences whatever these preferences may be. See generally
JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1781); Richard

A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, lo6 (1979) [hereinafter
Posner 1979]. Despite its seemingly benevolent goal (increasing total happiness), utilitarianism is hard
to apply and even harder to justify. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 57 (1981)
[hereinafter THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE]; infra note 256 (discussing the measuring problem that
plagues utilitarianism). Under a utilitarian approach one may be able to justify genocide if the villain's
happiness and the enjoyment from the massacre and freed resources would outweigh the misery to the
victims and other members of society. See THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 57 (citing Alan Donagan, Is
There a Credible Form of Utilitarianism,in CONTEMPORARY UTILITARIANISM 187, 188 (Michael D. Bayles
ed., 1968)) (noting that under utilitarianism a grandchild who painlessly murders his "malicious, old and
unhappy grandfather" so that his "children would be rejoiced by their inheritances" would be
considered a good man). Similarly, one could defend a totalitarian regime on utilitarian grounds if she
believes that the tyrant could maximize society's happiness better than its members. It can also justify
a society in which all resources are owned by one individual if any other distribution would decrease

total happiness. Utilitarianism in its strongest version can justify slavery if one could show that the
master's pleasure from enslaving outweighs the suffering caused to her subjects; and theft, if the thief
enjoys the stolen resource more than the original owner. In these situations, genocide, slavery,

tyranny, and theft would all be considered "just" and "moral" as they increase total happiness. These
examples highlight a basic problem in utilitarianism: that of "utility monsters." See ROBERT NozICK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 41 (1974). These are individuals (perhaps even animals) who can extract
so much happiness from a certain act or law that would overshadow the misery that the same would
inflict on others. Because the monster's happiness more than offsets everyone else's suffering, the act
increases total happiness and is thus deemed ethical. See Posner 1979 supra, at 131 ("[The] 'utility
monster' has no place in a system of ethics founded on wealth maximization."). On the confusion that

surrounds the terms "utility" and "utilitarianism" and the difference between utilitarianism and wealth
maximization, see infra note 253.
212. RAWLS 1971, supra note 2, at 136-37; RAWLS REVISED, supra note 2, at II8.

213. See supra notes 19, 141 and accompanying text; infra Part III.A.i.
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primary resources that would maximize the well-being of the least
advantaged member of that society. Rawls refers to the second principle
as the "difference principle.".. Others refer to it as the "maximin"
because it advocates for a distribution that would maximize the minimum
level of primary goods held by the worst-off member of society."'
Primary goods are goods which every member of society desires."
Because primary goods are so crucial, individuals behind the veil of
ignorance would seek to obtain more of these goods." Such primary
goods include basic rights and liberties but also, importantly, wealth and
income.
Rawls' Theory of Justice, undoubtedly one of "the most searching
investigation[s] of the notion of justice in modem times," . has been
subject to much criticism for a number of reasons, a few of which are
discussed below.22 o To begin with, according to Rawls, rational
individuals at the original position would not agree on a rule that allows
members of society to reap and keep the fruits of their acumen, efforts
and superior talent-all of which are part of their initial endowment and
would thus violate the difference principle."' Rather, members of society
*218

214.

RAWLS 1971, supra note 2, at 76-8o; RAWLS REVISED, supra note 2, at 65-70.
See, e.g., Arrow, supra note 19, at 248.
216. RAWLS 1971, supra note 2, at 62, 92, 433; RAWLS REVISED, supra note 2, at 54, 79, 380.
217. RAWLS 1971, supra note 2, at 142, 144; RAWLS REVISED, supra note 2, at 123, 125.
218. RAWLS 1971, supra note 2, at 92; RAWLS REVISED, supra note 2, at 79. The application of the
difference rule results in a more egalitarian society. It could even lead to a "radical equalization of
income." Arrow, supra note 19, at 258; see Robert Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules
and Social Justice, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV I, 14 & n-51, 15 & n.52 and accompanying text. To illustrate,
assume a two-member society has $200 to distribute. A distribution that would endow one member
with $199 and the other with $I would violate the difference rule. To see why, assume that one
member received the first dollar. With $199 to be allocated, the different rule requires that the other
member-the now least-advantaged member with no assets-would receive the next dollar before the
endowed member receives a second. An additional (third) dollar would then be allocated to either of
the members. The latter allocation would lead, once again, to inequality as one member would have $2
whereas the other only $1. The next dollar would be therefore allocated to the least well-off member
of society (the one who has only $I). At the end of the process only a distribution that provides each
member with $too would conform with the difference rule and would thus be "fair." Any other
distribution would be considered "immoral." Although the difference rule leads to a more equal
society it does not always require that resources should be equally distributed. In fact, the difference
principle may mandate an unequal allocation of resources if such allocation would benefit the least
advantaged member of society. RAWLS 1971, supra note 2, at 76-80; RAWLS REVISED, supra note 2, at
65-70. For example, it would justify that an otherwise idle parcel of land is given to only one member
of society, if the latter develops it and by doing so increases the value of the property owned by the
least well-off individual. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Determining Health Care Rights from Behind a
Veil of Ignorance, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 8oi, 8o6-o7 (noting that in a three-person society that is
endowed with a hammer, a saw, and a wrench, it would be justifiable to allocate the entire set to the
best carpenter if she would build a house for the two others).
215.

219. Arrow, supra note 89, at 245.

22o. See generally id.; Harsanyi 1975, supra note i9. It should be noted that this Article highlights
only some of the criticism on Rawls and in no way does it attempt to constitute a full discussion of
Rawls' Theory of Justice.
221. See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 218, at 8o8. Korobkin acknowledges that "[e]ven if all
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would agree to distribute and redistribute the primary resources."' Such
a rule, however, would reduce individuals' incentive to work and thus
result in a reduction of primary goods-those goods which, according to
Rawls, are so crucial that every individual would prefer more.
Not only would the Rawlsian conception of justice result in the
production of less primary assets, but the distribution itself might
impoverish society.' Consider, for example, three possible states of the
world, summarized in Table 2 below. In the first, the distribution of
wealth is such that 50% of the population (Class A) have no wealth and
50% (Class B) have $2oo each. In the second, every individual has $ioo
(regardless of her class). In the third, 50% of the population (Class A)
has $99 and 50% (Class B) has $5ol. Under the difference rule the
second state of the world would be chosen because the worst-off
members (Class A) do best, although in the third state societal wealth is
three times higher ($6oo compared to $2oo) and each of the worst-off
members receives only $I less compared to State 2.224
TABLE 2: CHOOSING WEALTH DISTRIBUTIONs BEHIND A VEIL OF IGNORANCE

States
State I
State 2
State 3

Class A

Class B

0

200

100

100

99

5o

Another flaw in Rawls' Theory of Justice is its seemingly irrational,
unacceptable, and thus by definition immoral, results.' Consider, for
example, a society in which the least well-off class of people is healthy
but bald, and it must decide how to exploit its healthcare budget. The
budget can be invested in finding a cure for baldness or to purchase
drugs with therapeutic effects, such as a cure for psoriasis. Or, consider a
situation in which a doctor at an accident scene must decide which of two
individuals in society were to begin their lives with identical resources and opportunities, some would
undoubtedly accumulate more primary goods than others, a result of some combination of natural
skills and talents," and argues that according to Rawls individuals behind the veil would "agree to
redistribute these resources throughout the population." On the other hand, according to Epstein they
would choose to "contract for a social structure that permits each citizen to keep the resources that he
accumulates as a result of superior natural talents (and initial endowments)." Id. (citing RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT To HEALTH CARE? 14-15
222. See, e.g., id.

(1997)).

EcoNoMic ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note I, at 497.
Rawls himself rejects this possibility. See RAWLs 1971, supra note 2, at 157; RAWLS REVISED,
supra note 2, at 136. However, Posner finds his argument to be unpersuasive. See, e.g., EcONOMiC
ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note I, at 497 n.2
225. See, e.g., Arrow, supra note 19, at 251, 255 ("[T]he maximin principle would lead to
unacceptable consequences if the world were such that [Rawls' conception of justice and
utilitarianism] really differed."); Harsanyi 1975, supra note i9, at 595-97, 6o5 ("Rawls theory
consistently yields morally highly unacceptablepolicy conclusions.").
223.

224.
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individuals she should treat: a mentally-challenged person who is
severely injured and would certainly die, or an intelligent individual who
would surely recover."' Even if the first cannot be saved and treatment
would provide her only with a few seconds of relief, and the second
would survive but remain paralyzed if not treated immediately, the
difference rule mandates that the former is treated first. It would also
require the investment of the health budget in finding a panacea for
baldness rather than purchasing drugs to treat the sick.227 Put differently,
the difference rule gives total priority to the worst-off individual and
disregards the marginal benefits and costs conferred by the allocation.
The results of the difference rule are not only unacceptable -even
behind a veil-but they also contradict our sense of morality and ethical
practices.2 The difference rule is also impractical because it requires
society to identify the worst-off member, which in turn requires society
to determine whether A is "happier" than B, a question society cannot
determine without a utilitarian hedonic-meter."'
But even if resources could be distributed in a "just way" by using
Rawls' difference rule, such a distribution would be futile. Allowing
individuals to engage in voluntary transactions would result in a new
distribution that most likely would no longer conform with the theory of
justice that mandated the initial distribution.23 o Redistribution would thus
226.

The examples draw on Harsanyi and Arrow. Harsanyi 1975, supra note 19, at 596; Arrow,

supra note 19, at 251.
227. A related problem is that of "misery monsters," the corollary of the utilitarian "utility
monsters." See NOZICK, supra note 2HI. The term refers to people who are the worst-off members of
society (and hence are first in the line for resource allocation), yet are incapable of becoming happier,
so that any allocation afforded to them would constitute a pure waste and would only impoverish the
society. See Arrow, supra note 19, at 253 (noting that under Rawls' difference rule if the worse-off
member of society happens to be "an individual who is incapable of deriving much pleasure... [will
become] the touchstone of distribution policy, even though he derives little satisfaction from the
additional income"); Posner 1979, supra note 21I, at 131 ("[The] 'utility' monster has no place in a
system of ethics founded on wealth maximization.").
228. Posner 1979, supra note 211, at n1o (noting that an ethical theory can be rejected on three
grounds one of which is if it "yields precepts sharply contrary to widely shared ethical intuitionsprecepts such as that murder is in general a good thing").
229. See, e.g., Arrow, supra note 19, at 253 ("Rawls maximin criterion also implies interpersonal
comparison, for we must pick out the least advantaged individual, and that requires statements of the
form, 'individual A is worse off than individual B."'); Rasmussen, supra note 218, at 21 (applying
Rawls' Theory of Justice to bankruptcy and noting that "[i]n applying the difference principle ... I
freely admit that I cannot a prioriidentify the group that is the least-advantaged").
230. See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text. This is illustrated by Nozick's famous Wilt
Chamberlain example. See NoZICK, supra note 21I, at i6o-62. To illustrate, assume that initially the
assets of an n-member society (denoted by A) were distributed in a manner which is considered "fair."
Call this distribution D,. Perhaps the assets were distributed equally such that each member received
A/n. This distribution might be considered "just" by egalitarians, Rawlsians, and even utilitarians,
assuming, for example, that all members have the same decreasing marginal utility. Assume that n-i
members of society voluntarily paid some amount, p, to another member for her services. Immediately
after the transactions took place a new distribution (D.) resulted: n-i members (those who paid) would
have less than A/n (each would have A/n-p) and one member, the recipient, would have more than
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inflict immediate costs without creating sustainable benefits. Moreover,
such redistribution would interfere with people's ability to engage in free
exchanges and violate the very individual liberties that Rawls sought to
protect.
Finally, Rawls' difference rule-the principle that any allocation
must advantage the worst-off member of society-assumes that
individuals are risk averse."' To see why, assume that a society described
in Table 2 above must choose between State I (a distribution under
which the entire wealth of society is shared by 50% of the population so
that each gets $2oo) and State 2 (in which every member gets $ioo). If
members of the society were risk neutral they would be indifferent
between the two states because their expected value in each is the same:
$ioo. The reason is simple: behind a veil, individuals do not know
whether they would end up in Class A or Class B. Thus, if State I is
chosen, each member has a 50% chance to be in Class A and receive
nothing and a 50% chance to be in Class B and enjoy a wealth of $200.
Put differently, behind the veil the expected value of one's wealth is $ioo
(50% x 0 + 50% X 200). If State 2 is chosen each member receives (with
full certainty) $ioo worth of assets. The risk-neutral person looks only at
the expected value which is the same in both states. She will thus be
indifferent between receiving $ioo with certainty (State 2) or a risky
prospect with the same expected value (State I). If the parties were risk
seekers they would prefer to forgo the safe endowment of $ioo in State 2
in the hope to get high returns in State I: the chance to get $200 in case
they happen to be type B after the veil is pierced. Only a Rawlsian
society of risk-averse individuals would prefer the safe payment of $ioo
to avoid the uncertainty.
The assumption that individuals are risk averse is not without
merits. People usually experience a declining marginal utility from
money.23 2 That is, they prefer more income to less, but the pleasure from
an additional dollar decreases as they become richer. Put differently,
people value the first dollar more than the second and would thus likely
prefer a $ioo payment to a lottery ticket with a 50% chance of winning
$200. But this is not always true. Indeed, if members of society were all

A/n (she would have A/n+np). "If D, was a just distribution, and people voluntarily moved from it to
D,isn't D, also just?" Id. at 161; see also Korobkin, supra note 218, at 8i.
231. See, e.g., ECONoMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note I, at 497; Hockett, supra note 129, at 1291;
Swygert & Yanes, supra note 141, at 305-o8. An individual is "risk averse" if she prefers a certain
amount, M, to any risky prospect with an expected value of M. She is risk neutral if she is indifferent
between receiving M with certainty or a risky prospect with an expected value of M. She is risk seeker
if she prefers a risky prospect with an expected value of M over a certain amount of M.
232. See, e.g., EcONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note I, at II ("[R]isk aversion is a corollary of
the principle of diminishing marginal utility.").
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or always233 risk averse, lotteries, casinos, and investment banking would
exist only in theory.
But Rawls does not simply assume that individuals behind the veil
of ignorance are "just" risk averse. Rather, by adopting the difference
rule, Rawls assumes that they are infinitely risk averse.234 To illustrate,
assume that a society with the two classes described in Table 3 below
must choose between State I, a distribution under which each member
receives $1; and State 2, a distribution under which members of class B
receive $iooo. Assume further that there are iooo individuals in that
society, I in class A and the remaining 999 in class B. A society whose
members are risk neutral would prefer State 2 because it has a higher
expected value ($999 compared to $I).235 Yet, Rawls' risk-averse society
would choose State I over State 2. Under Rawls' maximin principle, each
individual acts as if she were sure that she would be the worst-off
member in that society and give up any gain, however high and probable,
if it is not certain.236 This means that individuals in a Rawlsian world are
so risk averse that they would give up the very high chance (99.9%) of an
enormous gain ($iooo) to secure a certain payment of $I. They would
also prefer a distribution that gives every individual $ioo over one in
which some individuals get $99 and others $501 (States 2 and 3 in Table 2).
TABLE

3:

CHOOSING WEALTH DISTRIBUTIONS BEHIND A VEIL OF IGNORANCE
A

State I
State 2

B

I

I

0

1000

That individuals are infinitely risk averse is a factual assertion that is
hard to accept. Most likely, risk-averse individuals have varying levels of
aversion to risk, and it is not clear why Rawls' procedure -agreement
behind the veil of ignorance-would produce the substantive difference
rule. Put differently, it is not clear why individuals would adopt the
233. See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of
Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (i98i).
234. See, e.g., ECONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note I, at 497; Swygert & Yanes, supra note 141,
at 308; Hockett, supra note 129, at 1291; Arrow, supra note 19, at 251 (arguing that Rawls veil of
ignorance assumes "an extreme form of risk aversion").
235. In State i, behind the veil, each member regardless of her class receives a certain, and thus
also expected, value of $1. In State 2 there is some uncertainty. Behind the veil, members of society do
not know whether they will end up in class A or B. Each has a o.t% chance of receiving $o (there is
/Thooochance a member would end up in class A) and a 99.9% chance of receiving $iooo (there is
999/iooo chance a member would end up in class B). The expected value in State 2 is thus $999
(o.i% X o + 99.9% x I,ooo).

236. Harsanyi 1975, supra note 19, at 595-96 ("[Alccording to the maximin principle [an individual
behind the veil] has to evaluate any particular institutional framework as if he were sure that this was
exactly what would happen to him.").
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maximin rather than any other maximand.2 They may equally choose
the maximax, under which a favorable distribution is such that
advantages the most well-off member of society.3 8 Or they may choose to

maximize expected utility, as was offered by Harsanyi,239 or any other
maximand for that matter. After all, they may end up risk averse,
neutral, or seeking individuals when the veil is pierced, a fact alluded to
by Rawls himself.24 o
Finally, the decision rule adopted by Rawls, the so-called difference
or maximin rule, is not only divorced from reality, but it would also lead
to a parade of absurdities. Because under the rule one must decide based
upon the worst possibility that may occur, however unlikely, people who
take the maximin principle seriously "could not ever cross a street (after
all, [they] might be hit by a car); ... could never drive over a bridge
(after all, it might collapse); ... [and] could never get married (after all, it
might end in a disaster)." 24 ' "If anybody really acted this way," noted
Harsanyi, she "would soon end up in a mental institution." 24 2
Yet, despite these flaws, when the Missouri Supreme Court replaced
the no contribution rule with contribution, it relied not only on fairness
between tortfeasors,243 but it also relied, explicitly, on Rawls. In Missouri
Pacific Railroad Co. v. Whitehead & Kales Co., an en banc decision, the
court analogized the law of "joint and concurrent tortfeasor liability" to
an "old time-worn building" that "has lost its architectural integrity."2 " It
then held that "[o]nly the foundation - the principleoffairness-remains
undisturbed and sturdy," and concluded that it is "obligated to
reconstruct [the law] upon the principle of fairness."245 The "principle of
fairness," it found, "compels [the] adoption of a system for the
distribution of joint tort liability on the basis of relative fault.",,6 Most
significantly, the court made it clear that by the "principle of fairness" it
adopted Rawls' Theory of Justice 247 so that "in exchange for the
237. See, e.g., Rasmussen, supra note 218, at 15 ("[T]he difference principle is the most
controversial aspect of Rawls' work, with many commentators doubting that it would emerge from the
original position.").
238. Korobkin, supra note 218, at 8o7-o8 ("[Alithough Rawls believes that [individuals behind the
veil] would choose the difference principle as the substantive basis for distributing primary
goods.. the acceptance of the veil of ignorance as the proper proceduraldevice for creating a just
society does not require the acceptance of his conclusion.").
239. Harsanyi 1975, supra note 19, at 598.
240. RAWLS 1971, supra note 2, at 137; RAWLs REVISED, supra note 2, at 118.
241. Harsanyi 1975, supra note 19, at 595.

242. Id.; see also Arrow, supranote 19, at 251 (calling the maximin principle "hardly acceptable").
243. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Whitehead & Kales Co., 566 S.W.2d 466,469 (Mo. 1978) (en banc).
244. Id. at 472.

245. Id. (emphasis added).
246. Id. at 474.
247. Id. at 469 n.4, 470; Steinman v. Strobel, 589 S.w.2d 293, 296 (Mo. 1979) (Donnelly, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 566 S.W.2d at 469) (noting that the Supreme Court in
Whitehead "embraced the concept [of justice], as explicated in Rawls, A Theory of Justice, that 'in
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opportunity of some undertaking, we each promise all others that we will
be liable for the damage which our own negligence in the undertaking
has caused.""
The court's analysis, however, was flawed and its conclusion
unsupported. It did not provide any explanation for the conclusion that
the no contribution rule is unfair, save the ex-post result that the victim
could choose arbitrarily to recover from one tortfeasor her entire
damage.2 49 Nor did the cursory decision provide any basis for adopting
Rawls' Theory.5 o The court seemed to adopt the concept of the veil-the
idea of hypothetical original position where members can enter into a
social bargain-but it did not explain why this contractarian approach
requires the adoption of Rawls' Theory, with its much criticized maximin
rule. This Article, while recognizing Rawls' immense contribution,
argues that in the apportionment context, an alternative conception of
justice should apply. This conception not only retains the social contract
approach and avoids many of the flaws that accompany the maximin
rule,"' but also seems to be better tailored to our tort system.
C. WEALTH MAXIMIZATION
An alternative moral theory and one which can also be justified on
contractarian grounds, but adopts a different maximand, is wealth
maximization or, to use Posner's terminology, economic analysis."'
Wealth maximization is not concerned with "happiness" -as is the case
under utilitarianism"' -but, as the name suggests, with wealth. The two
exchange for the opportunity of some undertaking, we each promise all others that we will be liable
for the damage which our own negligence in the undertaking has caused')
248. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 566 S.W.2d at 469 n.4.

249. Id. at 473 ("To limit any apportionment of damages between tortfeasors to those whom the
plaintiff has chosen to sue and against whom judgment is rendered is an inartful and capricious policy,
relying in excess upon the whim and wrath of a plaintiff before concurrent wrongdoers can share
liability.").

250. The court's discussion of Rawls' Theory was limited to a footnote. See sources cited supra
notes 247-48.
251. Dennis C. Mueller, Robert D. Tollison & Thomas D. Willett, The Utilitarian Contract: A
Generalizationof Rawls' Theory ofJustice,4 THEORY & DECISION 345,350 (1974) (arguing that some of
the criticism on "the difference principle can be eliminated by assuming that individuals in the original
position maximize their expected utilities").
252. THE EcoNoMIcs OF JUSTICE, supra note 211, at 6o-6i; Richard A. Posner, Wealth
Maximization Revisited, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 85 (1985) [hereinafter Posner 19851;
Posner 1979, supra note 211, at ii9. But see Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.
191 (1980); Rizzo, supra note 104.
253. See supra note 211 (discussing utilitarianism). The terms utility and welfare have been subject
to much confusion. See, e.g., Posner 1979, supra note 211, at ro4-o5, (distinguishing utilitarianism,

which is concerned with maximizing happiness, from economics, which is concerned with maximizing
welfare, and explaining that the two terms have been confused for many reasons, one of which is "the
tendency in economics to use the term 'utility' as a synonym for welfare, as in the expression 'utility
maximizing"'); Posner 1985, supra note 252, at 87 (using the term wealth as a synonym for "expected
utility" and explaining that the former is a function of willingness to pay or part with); Richard A.

1780o

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:I1729

are of course related: The more wealth one has the happier she is likely
to be. But wealth and happiness are fundamentally different. A person's
wealth is defined as the dollar equivalent of all her goods, services, and
entitlements, such as leisure, privacy, strength, and talents.254 It is the
amount of money she is willing and able to pay for something or, if she
already has it, the amount of money she demands to part with it.255
Wealth, unlike utility as that term is used by utilitarian philosophers, is
therefore measurable.' It does not require imaginary hedonic-meters,
but information on individuals' willingness to pay for or to part with a
thing. Such information is often revealed by the market. Even in
circumstances where a market transaction cannot take place, as in the
case of an unconscious patient in need of a medical treatment, it is
relatively easy to guess the resource allocation that would maximize
societal wealth and the shadow price of the commodity transferred or
service rendered;' or, put differently, to mimic the market.' In the

Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication,
8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 497 (1980) [hereinafter Posner 1980] (noting that wealth maximization can be
viewed as imposing a constraint on utilitarianism "that people may seek to promote their utility only
through the market or institutions modeled on the market"). Posner, it should be noted, seems to
reject Harsanyi's analysis, which gives the same weight to every individual and instead proposes a
thinner veil, one in which individuals are aware of their endowments. See id. at 499.
254. Posner 1979, supra note 211, at ii9. For a criticism on this definition, see Rizzo, supra note
1o4, at 643, 645.
255. EcoNoMic ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note I, at lo; THE EcoNoMIcs or JUSTICE, supra note 211,
at 6o-6i; Posner 1979, supra note 211, at ii9.

256. Utilitarianism is concerned with maximizing total happiness. See supra note 211. Measuring
happiness, however, is a formidable task. And if it cannot be measured how can it be aggregated? The

literature often speaks of "utils" -arbitrary interpersonal units to measure happiness-but it does not
solve the measurement problem (at least until "util" or hedonic meters are invented). It has been
proposed that the measuring problem and the "happiness monstrosity" can be avoided if one adopted
policies or laws, still on utilitarian grounds, that are Pareto superior. See, e.g., THE ECONOMICS OF
JUSTICE, supra note 211, at 54-56 (Posner is willing to assume that "[t]he Pareto approach may seem to
offer a solution to the problem of measuring satisfaction" under certain conditions.); Hockett, supra
note 129, at 1277 ("Pareto-efficiency as a criterion... might have circumvented the utilitymeasurement and compatibility problems."). Pareto himself was concerned with interpersonal
comparison noting that "a sum of [utilities or utils] is a thing that has no meaning: there is no such
sum, and none such can be considered," and for this reason he invented his famous criterion. See IV
VILFREDO PARETO, THE MIND AND SOCIETY § 21n, at 1458 (1935); see also VINCENT TARASCIo, PARETO
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH TO EcoNoMics 79-84 (1966) (explaining that Pareto created the criterion
which bears his name because "he felt that interpersonal comparisons of... individuals cannot be
made"); Posner 1980, supra note 253, at 488. But this is only partially true. In fact utilitarianism, as
opposed to economic theory discussed in Part IV.C infra, would not support all voluntary transactions.
It is easy to show that if people's marginal enjoyment from money is decreasing-where the more
money they have, the less enjoyment they gain from an additional dollar-a free exchange on a
mutually agreed upon price would increase but not necessarily maximize the parties' happiness. On
the confusion that surrounds the terms "utility" and "utilitarianism" and the difference between
utilitarianism and wealth maximization, see supra note 253.
257. The "shadow price" is the price that society would assign to a good, service, or endowment for
which a market does not exist.
258. THE EcoNoMIcs OF JUSTICE, supra note 211, at 61.
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latter example, it is likely that had the parties been able to transact, the
patient would be willing to pay the market price for medical services
required to save her life.
Because economic analysis seeks to maximize society's wealth
rather than its happiness, it avoids the monstrous results of both
utilitarianism and Rawlsianism."' Suppose, for example, that A is in need
of an organ transplant for which she is willing to pay $iooo, and that B,
the only suitable donor, is willing to sell that organ for $ 2 000." A pure
utilitarian would justify a court decree allowing A to harvest the organ,
against B's will, if A's happiness from the organ would be greater than
B's displeasure. The wealth maximizer, however, will oppose such a
decree because it would allocate the organ to the person who values it
less (A). Moreover, even if the numbers are reversed so that A values the
organ more than B, the wealth maximizer would still oppose a decree
forcing B, the low value user, to surrender the organ in question. In such
a low cost setting where there are only two parties, there is simply no
reason for the law to intervene. If A truly values the organ more than B
the parties will enter into a voluntary transaction at a price between
$Iooo-$2o, and the resource-here the body part-would gravitate
from the low value user to the high value user. 6 If, on the other hand,
transaction costs are prohibitive, a wealth-maximizing court would be
willing to imitate the market and allow one to harvest the organ from
another,26 2 but only if the latter is compensated.263
Because wealth maximization is a market-based theory that relies
heavily on voluntary exchanges, it provides greater respect to individual
freedoms and choices compared to utilitarianism and Rawlsianism.,64 It is
a meritocracy in which individuals can keep or sell their work product.
With few exceptions, no one can be compelled to do anything, transfer a
259. See id. at 62-63.

260. For an analysis of the market for body parts, see generally J. Shahar Dillbary, Emergencies,
Body Partsand Price Gouging,in SOVEREIGNTY, EMERGENCY, LEGALITY (Austin Sarat ed., 2010).
261. See, e.g., McFall v. Shimp, io Pa. D. & C.3d 90, 91-92 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1978) (refusing to force a
close relative to undergo a transplant to save the plaintiff who suffered from a rare disease, curable
only by a bone marrow transplant from the defendant). For an analysis of this decision, see Dillbary,
supra note 260, at 4-7.
262. See, e.g., Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 146, 149 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969). The court in Strunk
compelled one individual, an incompetent ward of the state with an I.0. comparable to that of a sixyear-old, to give his kidney to his brother who suffered from a fatal kidney disease. Id. Because the
transplant was beneficial to both (saving one's life and ensuring the survival of a future guardian), but
the parties could not transact (due to the inability of the incompetent brother to communicate), the
court mimicked the market. See id.; see also Dillbary,supra note 260, at 4-7.
263. For a different interpretation, see Anthony T. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative
Principle,9 J. LEGAL STUD. 227, 231-32 (198o).
264. THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 211, at 66; see also Arrow, supra note 19, at 257
(criticizing Rawls' objection to utilitarianism on the grounds that it treats individual as means rather
than ends because it requires "some individuals sacrifice for the benefit of others" and arguing that the
maximin rule leads to same result when it requires that the better off sacrifice for the less well off).
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right, relinquish a commodity, or render a service against her will.
Commodities, services, and rights must be bought in the marketplace and
each such voluntary transaction produces a surplus that increases total
wealth.SS Importantly, rights are not assigned arbitrarily by a master
planner to the worse-off member of society in complete disregard of total
wealth or the resulting marginal benefits and costs of such an act. Rather,
they are assigned through the market to the high value user.
Undoubtedly, Posner's theory is not free of what many would
consider to be morally unacceptable results,'6 and it has its detractors.267
To many, the most offending feature of wealth maximization as a moral
theory is the result of its most important ingredient, wealth, defined as
the amount an individual is willing and able to pay.'6 The definition
favors, at least on its face, the rich over the poor. It gives an advantage to
those who already have one.
Take the textbook factory-resident example where a central planner
must decide whether the factory should have the right to pollute or the
resident the right to be free from pollution.6 Assume that the factory's
benefits from production outweigh the damage to the resident, that there
are no other third party effects, and that transaction costs are not
prohibitive. Under these conditions, the Coase theorem tells us that it
does not matter who receives the right to pollute. At the end of the day
the factory will be the owner of the right, whether it was given the right
or it bought the right from the resident. But it does matter-at least to
those who care about distributive justice. The initial assignment would
make one party, the assignee, richer and the other poorer. The
assignment is tantamount to a windfall that does not impact the resource
allocation but does impact the wealth distribution. To illustrate, if the
benefit to the factory from production is $2000 and the damage to the
resident from pollution is $1200, then assigning the right to the resident
would make the resident-seller richer because she would be able to take
a bite at the $8oo surplus. A price of $1700, for example, would increase
265. THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 21I, at 79.
266. See, e.g., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note I, at 271; THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra
note 211, at 83, 86. See also Posner's discussion of resource allocation under budget constraints, id. at
ii; Dworkin, supra note 252; Posner 1979, supra note 211, at 131 (discussing slavery and torture);
Rizzo, supra note 104. But see Mueller, Tollison & Willett, supra note 251, at 349 (arguing that under

certain conditions "Rawls' own theory will allow slavery").
267. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 252; Kromnan, supra note 263, at 229 (concluding that "wealth
maximization is an absurd principle to adopt" and that it "is not only an unsound ideal, it is an
incoherent one which cannot be defended from any point of view"); Rizzo, supra note 104.
268. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 252, at 207-12; Rizzo, supra note 1o4, at 648-51.
269. See, e.g., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note s, at 61; Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas

Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L.
REV. IO89, 1121 (1972); R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. I, 1-2 (196o); Russell
B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Efficiency and Equity: What Can Be Gainedby Combining Coase and
Rawls?, 73 WASH. L. REV. 329,336 (1998).
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the resident's wealth by $500 and the factory's by $300. If it is assigned to

the factory, on the other hand, it would confer a benefit of $2000 upon
the factory but it would make the resident poorer by $1200. In either case
the right or resource ends up in the hands of the high value user-the
factory-and total wealth increases by $8oo.7o
The example demonstrates that economic analysis is neutral as to
whether the resulting allocation would make some wealthier than others.
The distribution of wealth is simply not a (major) concern in economic
analysis. The Second Theorem of Welfare Economics is an expression of
this idea. 7 ' According to this theorem, society should not try to maximize
welfare and achieve distributive "fairness" at the same time.2 72 Rather, it
should undertake a two-step process. In the first stage resources should
be allocated to their most efficient use, and only then can redistributive
policies such as taxation be entertained. Boldly put, efficiency comes
first, distributive justice second. 7 ' This neutrality or low priority to
distributive justice concerns has been subject to much criticism.
Korobkin and Ulen report that:
For decades, one of the most constant criticisms of the economic
analysis of law has been that it fails to address distributive justice
concerns. The critics say that this failure, in combination with the
seemingly single-minded commitment of law and economics to
efficiency as a (or the) legal norm, places law and economics well
outside the law's long-standing and deep commitment to justice.
Moreover, according to the critics, the field is out of step with society
at large, which, through both norms and laws, seems far more
committed to fairness and equity than to efficiency.2 74
A number of attempts have been taken to combine the efficiency
norm with distributive justice. Swygert and Yanes, for example, offer a
model that combines efficiency norms with the Rawlsian concept of
fairness mixed with what they call "empathy.""' Specifically, they assume
that parties are risk averse, and they argue that behind a veil of
ignorance such parties would agree to divide the surplus from the
transaction (the $8oo in the factory example)." In Swygert and Yanes's
model, people behind the veil have full information of everyone's
attributes such as sex, age, and wealth, but they do not know which party

270. For attempts to address this problem, see Swygert & Yanes, supra note 141, at 257 (offering a
theory that "embraces the requirements of efficiency but is qualified by constructive empathy").
271. See HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMics: A MODERN APPROACH 515, 517-18 (4th
ed. 1996); Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 269, at 341-42 & n-37.
272. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 269, at 341-42.
273. Id. at 342.
274. Id. at 329.
275. Swygert & Yanes, supra note 141.

276. Id. at 314-16 (stating that in their model, the object of the bargaining process behind the veil
of ignorance "is to reach a consensus that will maximize the well-being of each of the parties while
minimizing the risk to each").
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to the transaction they would become."' In the nuisance example, the
parties will not know whether they will be the factory owner or resident
once the curtain is unveiled. They will thus be willing to share the surplus
in order to minimize the risk to which they are so averse. Swygert and
Yanes's model, however, suffers from a number of flaws:"7 it relies on
unrealistic assumptions, for example that all parties are equally wealthy
prior to the transaction;2 7 9 it may lead to inefficiencies;'8 it is limited to
contractual contexts;"' and, it is hard to apply.5 2 Importantly, it adopts a
version of the maximin principle, with its universal risk aversion
assumption, that has been subject to much criticism.5 3
A more appealing alternative that also combines efficiency and
equity is Korobkin and Ulen's "market contrarian" approach." Under
this approach, if the parties (i) face the same decreasing marginal utility
from money, and (2) are equally wealthy, then the right should be
allocated to the party who values it less (the neighbor in the factory
example). Such an assignment combined with a "super-liability" rule will
force the high value user to purchase the right from the low value user
and thus share the surplus."' The "market contrarian" approach,
however, is a theory of "entitlement allocation."" It does not provide a
framework for analyzing externalities -that is tort law.
This Article joins these attempts in a very limited way. It does not
undertake to combine efficiency with fairness. Nor does it attempt to
devise a rule that would make an otherwise justice-neutral system a fair
one or to offer a new theory of justice. Rather, while still in the domain
of wealth maximization, this Article argues that the no contribution rule
is not only efficient.'8' It is also fair.

277. Id. at 315-16.

278. These flaws have been the subject of an article that appeared in the same review. See
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 269.
279. Id. at 334, 335.

280. Swygert & Yanes's model reduces the parties' incentive to produce and the cooperative
surplus where transaction costs (even if not prohibitive) are positive. See id. at 344-45.
281. Id. at 335.
282. Id. at 333-34.

283. Id. at 334 ("[T]he key insight that drives [Swygert and Yanes's] conclusions is that individuals
are risk averse.").
284. Id. at 331. The theory is suggested as an alternative to Swygert and Yanes's model and the
authors provide a critical review of its assumption. Id. at 343-47.
285. The authors define a super-liability rule as a rule that protects "the neighbors' entitlement
with a liability rule under which the condemnation price is set to divide the cooperative surplus
equally." Id. at 340.
286. Id. at 331, 335, 336-39. As such it also suffers from the Nozickian Wilt Chamberlain problem.
See supra note 230.
287. EcoNoMic ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note I, at 189-90.
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D. THE MAXIMAND REVISITED
There are a number of important reasons to prefer wealth
maximization over the difference rule to analyze the fairness of the tort
system. To begin with, the common law, especially tort law, seems to be
"best understood as a system of promoting economic efficiency,"'8 and
like economic analysis, it is, "for the most part, distributive neutral."""
Posner's famous claim is not only descriptive but it also has a normative
moral charge. Efficiency requires judges to ignore the initial assignments
of the parties before them. The fact that a party is rich or poor, a man or
a woman, black or white becomes inconsequential. Nor is it important
that the victim is bad and that the wrongdoer is good or a better person.
Simply put, wealth maximization is a theory of justice that is blind to
persons.'" Rawls' difference rule, in contrast, gives preference to the
least advantageous member of society and thus requires interpersonal
comparisons in order to identify that person. It is also inoperable, as such
identification cannot be performed without imaginary hedonic-meters.29 '
Yet, another ground for rejecting the difference rule is that it acts as
29 2 In the insurance
a form of a social insurance.
lingo, the difference rule
is a social policy under which the insurer (society) promises to
compensate the policyholders (its members) against the occurrence of a
specific event (that a member would turn out to be the least advantaged).
Unlike regular insurance, however, the difference rule imposes the same
insurance on all members of society, 3 even when the costs of such
insurance outweigh its benefits' and even when better and cheaper
alternatives are available. This is especially the case in the
apportionment context. When it comes to apportionment of liability, the
difference rule would likely mandate, at least on some occasions, the
adoption of a contribution rule.295 Assume for a moment that tortfeasors
288. Id. at 272; see also Keating, supra note 129, at 195 ("For the past twenty or thirty years,
scholars working the justice side of the divide have tended to assume that justice in tort law is a matter
of corrective justice.").
8

2 9. ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note I, at 272.
290. Id. at 560; see also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW Io8

(1948) ("The
standards of the law are standards of general application. The law takes no account of the infinite
varieties of temperament, intellect, and education which make the internal character of a given act so
different in different men. It does not attempt to see men as God sees them, for more than one
sufficient reason.").
291. But see Rizzo, supra note 104, at 642 (criticizing wealth maximization on similar grounds and
arguing that "[aln illusion of manageability has been created by the overly simple models within which
much of the economic analysis of law takes place").
292. See Hockett, supra note 129, at 1287, 1291; Robert Hockett, Just Insurance Through Global
Macro-Hedging:Information, Distributive Equity, Efficiency, and New Markets for Systemic-IncomeRisk-Pricingand Systemic Income-Risk-Trading in a "New Economy," 25 U. PA. INT'L EcoN. L. 107,
132, 156 (2004) [hereinafter Hockett 20041.
293. See Hockett 2004, supra note 292, at 156.
294. See, e.g., supra Part II.B; notes 227-228, 241-242 and accompanying text.

295. This contribution rule could take the direct form of comparative fault with contribution or the
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are solvent, that litigation costs are low and that litigation is certain.
Under these assumptions, a rule of no contribution would fully
compensate the victim, but it would expose one tortfeasor to the risk that
she would have to bear the entire damage. A contribution rule, on the
other hand, would still provide full compensation to the victim, but it
would also provide a form of insurance to the tortfeasor. The risk of
having to pay the victim for the wrong is spread among the tortfeasors. In
contrast, under the no contribution rule the tortfeasor who paid the
entire damage receives nothing.
It is doubtful that from a moral standpoint society needs to subsidize
insurance and offer compensation to wrongdoers. This is especially the
case when it comes to joint tortfeasors where each is found to cause the
entire damage. There is no reason to allow one tortfeasor to benefit from
the fact that others joined her in committing the tort. But even if people
behind the veil are interested in insurance against the lottery of life, the
difference (and thus a contribution) rule is only one form of insurance
and not necessarily the most desirable one. It is also unclear why the
legal system should impose the same social insurance on all, including
victims, when the marketplace offers private and individually tailored
policies to those tortfeasors who want and are willing to pay for them.
Truth be told, the legal system is already deeply involved in the
insurance business. Bankruptcy and the limited liability of corporations
provide a form of insurance to entrepreneurs against business losses.
Similarly, the old admiralty rule that two careless vessels must share
equally the damages of their collisionz9 was also a form of insurance"
because it provided compensation to the party who was heavily
damaged. JSL with contribution performs the same insurance function. It
limits the liability of each tortfeasor to a fraction of the damage. The
contribution rule, however, is different from these legal schemes in one
important aspect. The social insurance is justified in bankruptcy,
corporate limited liability, and colliding vessels because of a market
failure. In these situations insurance cannot (or could not, in the case of
admiralty) be provided by the marketplace whether because of moral
hazard (in the case of bankruptcy and limited liability) or the state of
technology (in the case of the colliding vessels).o But when the market
can meet the demand for insurance-as in the case of liability
insurance-there is no reason to use the tort system which is likely to be
more expensive and less efficient. In the words of Justice Holmes:
indirect form of a proportionate liability regime.
296. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S.

282, 284 (1952).

297. ECONOmic ANALYSIS OF LAw, supra note I, at 175.

298. Id. ("[U]ntil modern times, maritime transportation was an extraordinarily risky business
because of the great value of the ship and their cargoes and the significant probability of disaster, yet
market insurance was difficult to come by and as a result there was a demand for an insurance by
means of the tort system.").
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The state might conceivably make itself a mutual insurance
company against accidents, and distribute the burden of its citizens'
mishaps among all its members. There might be a pension for
paralytics, and state aid for those who suffered in person or estate
from tempest or wild beasts. As between individuals it might adopt
the mutual insurance principle pro tanto, and divide damages when
both were in fault, as in the rusticum judicium of the admiralty, or it
might throw all loss upon the actor irrespective of fault. The state
does none of these things, however, and the prevailing view is that
its cumbrous and expensive machinery ought not to be set in motion
unless some clear benefit is to be derived from disturbing the status
quo. State interference is an evil, where it cannot be shown to be a
good. Universal insurance, if desired, can be better and more cheaply
accomplished by private enterprise. The undertaking to redistribute

losses simply on the ground that they resulted from the defendant's
act would not only be open to these objections, but, as it is hoped
the preceding discussion has shown, to the still graver one of
offending the sense of justice.29
Although the excerpt refers to universal insurance for victims, the
point is even stronger when it comes to insuring tortfeasors.
Redistributing losses between tortfeasors, whether directly via a
contribution rule or indirectly by limiting their liability via a
proportionate liability rule, would equally offend "the sense of justice."
It is an "evil," to use Holmes' words, because it subsidizes social
insurance for those who committed a tort, even though such insurance is
readily available in the marketplace. The difference rule should thus be
rejected in the context of apportioning tort liability. A rule of no
contribution will require those who are interested in insurance to
purchase on the market at their own costs.
CONCLUSION

It has been argued that the no contribution rule is efficient," but is
it fair? Many argue that it is not. Even some celebrated champions of the
law and economics movement and economists concede that it may lead
to unfair consequences."o' The resentment to imposing on one tortfeasor
the entire burden of the judgment, regardless of her comparative fault,
caused all but one state, Alabama, to replace the old common law rule of
no contribution with alternative regimes. Some have adopted
comparative fault regimes. Under these regimes, in situations that give
rise to JSL a tortfeasor who paid the defendant more than her share can
299. HOLMES, supra note 290, at 96 (emphasis added).
300. ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAw, supra note I, at 189, 190.
30. See Mario J. Rizzo & Frank S. Arnold, Causal Apportionment in the Law of Torts: An
Economic Theory, 8o COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1399 (5980) (discussing contribution among tortfeasors

and concluding that "a more equitable sharing of the losses has become a reality"); supra Parts 1I.B,
III.E. But see Easterbrook, Landes & Posner, supra note 28 (distinguishing between ex-post and exante justice).
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seek contribution from the remaining tortfeasors. Other states abolished
JSL altogether and replaced it with proportionate liability. In these
jurisdictions each wrongdoer is liable for that proportion of the damage
that is attributed to her alone. She is not liable for the entire damage and
contribution is therefore not an issue.3o2 Fairness between wrongdoers
played a critical role where courts and legislators considered whether to
grant a right of contribution not only in torts but also in employment,
environmental, antitrust, patent, admiralty, and securities laws."
Although fairness between defendants is considered by many to be
"[t]he most powerful, and hence most frequently asserted, argument,"304 it is
one that has been challenged only rarely.3 5 This Article attempts to
challenge the fairness argument. By using the concept of the veil it seeks to
isolate the apportionment debate from the biases that shaped it and that
still fuel reformers. Using the concept of the veil to determine legal policies,
it should be noted, is by no means a new proposition. Rawls' version of the
veil, for example, has been applied to other areas of the law, including
contractual contexts,1 property rules and initial assignments of goods,3 7
and bankruptcy.38 Rawls' procedure was also used to determine whether a
right to health care should be recognized" and to assess the legitimacy of
judicial review.3"o At least one state supreme court raised Rawls' Theory of
Justice in deciding to reject the no contribution rule and replacing it with
contribution.3"' These attempts, however, adopted both Rawls' procedure
and the much-criticized difference rule which this Article, following

302. See supra Introduction.
303. For a review of some of these considerations in the context of securities, environmental law,
and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2oo6) (allowing but not
mandating a regime of JSL and 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (2oo6) authorizing contribution); Elizabeth A. Di
Cola, Fairness and Efficiency: Allowing Contribution Under ERISA, 8o CALIF. L. REV. 1543 (1992);
Bernard Chao, The Case for Contribution in Patent Law (Univ. of Denver Sturm Coll. of Law,
Working Paper No. ii-o2), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=17539t0 (arguing that patent law
should adopt a contribution rule and that "contribution will equitably spread liability among different
responsible parties in patent law (i.e. parties responsible for the same infringement)").
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
3o9.

Wright, supra note 123, at 5 1
Id. at 51-53.
Swygert & Yanes, supra note 141Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 269.
Rasmussen, supra note 218.
EPSTEIN, supra note 221; Korobkin, supra note 218, at 8o

(arguing that the question of

whether positive rights to health care should be recognized should be addressed from a "Rawlsian 'veil
of ignorance' perspective").
310. Lao-Tze Smith, We Don't Count! Rousseau's General Will as a Tool to Judge the Legitimacy
of the Judicial Decisions Relating to the PresidentialElections in Mexico and the United States, 15 LAW
&Bus. REV. AM. 339,339-51 (2008).

311. See Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Whitehead & Kales Co., 566 S.W.2d 466, 468-69 (Mo. 1978) (en
banc). The court recognized a right of contribution to avoid unfairness as between tortfeasors and held
that "[t]he long history of the law of joint and concurrent tortfeasor liability... is in fact a rich
expositional refinement of the principle of fairness" as this term is interpreted by Rawls. Id. "This
premise," the court explained, "is the basis of our fault-based system of tort liability." Id. at 469 n.4.
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Harsanyi and Posner, rejects. Instead it uses economic theory, and rather
than build on unrealistic assumptions, it relies on market mechanisms and
modem decision theory to argue the no contribution rule is as fair, indeed
even more equitable, than its alternatives.
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX

The expected liability behind a veil of uncertainty in a case involving
one victim, V and two tortfeasors, T, and T, is the same regardless of T's
solvency level. The solvency level is defined as the tortfeasor's ability to
pay the maximum amount for which she can potentially be found liable
and is denoted by s, (i.e., if s,<i the i' tortfeasor is insolvent). Diagram 3
shows the payoffs of the parties with and without contribution. These
payoffs are a function of the fault (a) and solvency (s,) levels of each
tortfeasor. For simplicity it is assumed without limitation if s # s.2 then
si>s, (s.j stands for the solvency level of the ith tortfeasor with regard to
the j branch).' Here p, and 9, stand for the share of the damage paid by
the tortfeasor i before and after contribution respectively.
DIAGRAM

3: JSL REGIME

WITH AND WITHOUT CONTRIBUTION

3 13

No (Pre-) With (Post-)
Contribution Contribution

T
gD

T 2 1T
g2D

6,D

T
0D

a,D aD

D s3 D

N/A

s, 4D s2 4D

N/A

s, 5D s.5 D

N/A

s,6D s,6D

N/A

s, D s.7 D

N/A

s,

If the tortfeasors can more than fully compensate the victim
(s, + s,>I), 3 14 then the victim will sue one or both tortfeasors and may recover
from each tortfeasor pD. Contribution may not be required (if pi, the
amount initially charged from the tortfeasor i is equal to a,) or even possible.
312. This simply means that if one tortfeasor is more solvent than the other, then the more solvent
tortfeasor is denoted as T, and the other as T,.
313. Branches 2-7 Could be collapsed into one branch, but for expositional purposes only, are
broken down to different scenarios according to the parties' fault level.
314. Whether because s >i, or because s,<i, but s,+s.
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Consider the case where s,>a,and p,74a,, for example, where T, is 30% at fault
and solvent and T is 70% at fault and can pay s,=8o% of the $ioo damage.
If the victim decided to recover from T, and T 20% and 8o% respectively
(i.e. p,=0.2 and p,=o.8), then T will receive $io in contribution from T, so
that at the end of the day each tortfeasor paid according to her fault level
(O,=a,). If, however, s,<a,, then one party (even post contribution) will bear
more than her share of fault (0,>a,). In the preceding example, if s,=i%,
then Twill pay at least 99% of the damage although she is only 30% at fault.
If none of the parties is fully solvent (s,,s,<I) but together they have
enough resources to fully compensate the victim (s, + s,= I), there are
three possible scenarios, marked as branches 2-4. In each the victim will be
able to fully recover her damages (for 2<j<4 ,si=i)but the final allocation
between the tortfeasors is different. In the first (branch 2), neither party
can pay the entire damage but all will compensate the victim according to
their fault (s,=a,; s,=a,) so no contribution is needed. In the second and the
third scenarios (branches 3 and 4), the victim also fully recovers but one
tortfeasor will pay more than her fault level without the ability to get any
contribution. Take for example scenario 2, under which s, + s,= I, s,>a, and
s,<a, (branch 3). Assume T, is 2% at fault but can pay 8o% of the damage
and T. is 98% at fault but can pay only 20% of the damage. If the damage
to the victim is $ioo then T, and T. will pay the victim $80 and $20
respectively, but T, who "overpaid" $78 (80-2) will not be able to get any
contribution from T, who has no more available assets.

If the combined assets of the parties are less than the injury to the
victim (s, + s,<I), there are three possible scenarios (marked as branches
5-7)."' This time the victim (by definition) will not be able to fully recover
her damages and contribution will also not be available to the tortfeasors
who paid more than her fault level. Consider the situation in which a,=o.6
(and hence a,=o4), s,=o.5 and s,=o.3 (branch 5). Under these conditions
none of the tortfeasors will fully pay her "share" (i.e., s,<a, and s,<a,) and
the victim will recover only 8o% of her damage.
By denoting 6, as the probability for the i"'branch, it is possible to
derive the expected liability of Ti behind the veil:
(I)

"ELr=-

D(sj+s 2 j

D+
j-1

j-5

315. A fourth situation in which s,>a, and s,> a, is impossible. If this was the case then it would be
true that s,+ s,> a,+ a. and, therefore, (because a, + a.= i) that s,+s,>i. But this would contradict the
assumption that s,+ s,< .
316. The expected recovery of the victim is the sum of the expected liability of the tortfeasors:
7
7
EL,, = 5,pD+ 8,a,D+ Y 5sliD and ELr = BjLD + 5,a,D+ E 6 s2 jD which can be simplified to
j-3

ER,=EI,+ELr2=

4 6

j-3

7
JD + E 3jD(4j+s2j) becausep,+p, =
j-15

and for 2<j<4 a, +a,= s,,+s 2,=

1.
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